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No.71-6278 OT 1971 
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States 
lA., .s. 
tJ..., .. s .. 
Cert to CA9(Browning, Carter, Trask).-Per Curiam 
Browning dissenting. 
Petr was stopped by a rovrung u.s. border patro~oming 
from the Mexican border m~xt~e into California. The officers 
has stopped petr's car for the specific purpose of checking i 
for aliens. When the miiigxz officers checked the car4of petr; 
it showed he was a resident alien of the United States. At that 
point, one of the officers looked under the ::aP ::at~ t~e ¥R~ig 
vehicle for aliens. Although the officer himself had never found -------aliens under the t rear seat of t~ex¥e~igie autos, he had heard 
of it being done. Moreover, just prior to this, there had been 
an information bulletin from the headquarters of the Border PAtrol 
advising them that alien sm~~i smugglers has developed a practice 
whereby the illegal aliens would sit up behind the back seatp 
with their legs folded under the zz rear seat cushion whose 
'\ 
--> 
springs had been removed. Under the rear seat, the officer 
discovered packages wxa~~a~xi containing marijuana¥ which led 
to petr's conviction. 
Petrs contention is that the marijuana s~ t~i thus ~i 
discovered should have been SM~xxas suppressed at txai trial 
and not admitted into evidence¥ on the ground that probable E 
cause-- admittedly absent here-- was required for the search. 
However, under 8 u.s.c. 1357(a)(3) immigration ~ficers have 
the power to conduct a warrantless search of vehicles within 
100 air miles of any external boundary, and probable caus~ is 
not required for such a search. The ~xi~Ei~aki principal limitation ---
upon the scope of such a search is that the Border Patrol may not 
search places in which no person co~ld hide. 
i i~a Given these ground rules, the search in question 
seems reasonable here. The search was made within 50 miles of the 
Mexican border and was conducted for the express purpose of 
~
discovering aliens. Based on the information available to the 
officer, trn search was conducted in a place where aliens couldt 
conceiva~ly be expected to hideo 
The only remaining question therefore is whether, as the 
dissent argues, the federal statute and the implememting ia~isiatiEn 
regulations permitting this kind of border search are EB~stitMiE~ai 
unconstitutionalo The circuit court decisions interpreting this -' statute have generally upheld it on the ~XiM~ grounds that it 
represents congressional recognition im of the right of the United 
States to protect its own boundaries against ta the illegal im~Exta 
importation of alienso I t~im am firmly of the belief that dep~ures 
from ixB~ normal probable_sause and warrant requirements are ~axmissi 
permissib~where something so essential to govto's right to keep 
unauthorized aliens out of the country is involved. For this reason 
I would affirm the majority below and DENY JHW 
.•. 
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Almeida-Sanchez v. United States 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
d cuss 
An affidavit has been submitted by Mr. ~sm James Chanoux 
ft"A.."+: c:- e.. 
who isxam has been admitted to pss ·' ; e kleii~: before this Court 
and has represented petr in the gB proceedings below. Petr has 
requested he be his appointed counsel for the proceedings here. Petr 
iag~ lacks funds for the hiring of counsel. I would grant this motion 





Notes re United States v. Almeida-Sanchez, No. 71-6278 
(1) Factual considerations: The stop occurred north of 
~-~ 
a. major ~l:;t·~tQ'lth artery (Hy 80, which runs from Tuscon, 
through Yuma and El Centro, to San Diego). The stop was 
executed on Hy 78, a Hy that does not run into Mexico at 
~·~ all. Indeed, it is a-rReFt:h seut+J. rode itself. 
The car in this case had not crossed the border but 
had been picked up in Calexico. 
(2) Major cases: 
(a) Camara & See~-building inspections in search of 
code violations are permissible without probable cause to 
believe that any particular dwelling is in violation 
where (1) an area search is reasonable in light of over-
all conditions in that area 9 and (2) there is a warrant .. 
(b) Colonnade & Biswell--limited searches of liquor 
and firearm's establishments are permissible without a 
warrant. Empahsis in these cases on the historic regula-
bility of the subject matter and the reduced expectation of 
privacy. 
(3) Analysis 
I would agree with the suspension of the warrant clause, 
---------on the basis of other automobile search cases. But, why 
suspend the requirement of probable cause? Surely the 
requirement can be suspended at the border, since the 
Government has an interest in maintaining the security of 
the borders and since, like d~in the case of a firearm 
dealer's license, one sacrifices his reasonable expectation 
of privacy when he desires to enter the country •. But, how 
~ -





not cross the border on a road north of a major pgrth?iQ~~h --------------------
intersection? 
I would require, first, that the Border Patrol have 
probable cause to believe that the vehicle crossed t e 
border. This could be based on (1) presence at the border; 
----........, 
(2) presence on a north-south road running from the border 
to some interse~tion of significant size; or (3) continued 
surveillance or other radiod notice of border-crossing. If 
this requirement is met then the Border Patrol might conduct 
a routine alien search. This is a mere extension of the 
border search. This requirement would require reversal of 
the instant case. 
Now 9 second, what standard should govern stops and 
searches in circumstances where there is no probable cause 
to believe that the car has crossed the border? Here we 
might distinguish between the stop and the search. The 
stop could be based on reasonable suspicion under Terry 
and Adams. Motorists could be stopped where an experienced 
Patrolman has reas~n to believe short of probable cause 
that he crossed the border. A brief detemtion for question-
ing could be acceptable and a subsequen~ search could be 
justified if the officers learn that the car has crossed 
the border (here probable cause might be gained from 
the motoristvs own mouth). 
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JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.hprnau QJourt of tift ~tb .ttatr. 
... lfingbm, ~. CIJ. 211~,., 
April 11, 1973 
Re: No. 71-6278 - Almeida-Sanchez v. United States 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
~rtutt Qfll'lttt ttf tqt 'Jllttift~ ~hUts 
.. N.lllthtgttttt. ~. <!f. 2ll'.;t't.$ 
CHAMBERS OF" . 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
April 12, 197 3 
Re: No. 71-6278 - Almeida-Sanchez v. United States 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
;/Ct. 6. 
Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBEriS OF 
.iuprnu:t ~ou.rt of t4t ~nittlt ,jtaftg 
~att4ington.l8. ~ 20.;t'!-~ 
.JuSTICE POTTER STEWART 
April 13, 1973 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 71-6278, Almeida-Sanchez v 0 United States 
In due course I plan to circulate a dissenting 








.iu:prtntt Q}onrt cf tqt Pttittb $5hdts 
'Diaslrmgtcn. 111. Q}. 2!l.;t~;t 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL April 19, 197 3 
T 
Re: No. 71-6278 - Almeida-Sanchez v. U. S. 
Dear Byron: 
I shall await Potter's dissent 
before voting on this one. 






.iuvuntt <q:on.rt of t4e 1ffttite~ ~tntcg 
Jras1Titl!lton. gl. QJ. 20&1'!~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WM . ..J. BRENNAN, .JR. May 3, 1973 
No. 71-6278 Almeida-Sanchez v. United States 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me in your dissenting opinion 
in the above. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
cc: The Conference 
/ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
,iiu:puntt QJcurt cf tqt 'J!htittb ~taftg 
11Jagfringtcn, ~. QJ. 2ll,?J!.;l 
May 3, 1973 
/ 
Re: . No. 11-6278 - Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S. 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me in your dissent. 
Sincerely, L 
T.M. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
cc: Conference 
'• 
j;141rtmt <!fonrt of tltt ~ttiitlt .$tatts 
J}asqmgton. ~. <q. 21lgiJ!.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM 0 . DOUGLAS May 4, 1973 
Dear Potter: 
Please join me in your dissent in 
71-6278, Almeida-Sanchez v. United States. 
William o. Douglas 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
cc: The Conference 
•, ' 
~~ F.tmt ~o:ud cf tqt ~ttb' ~ta:ftg 
'J:l.laglrhtght~ tB. <!}. 2 giJLt;} 
CHAMBERS Of' 
T HE CHIEF" JUSTICE May 9, 1973 
... 
Re: No. 71-6278 - Condrado Almeida-Sanchez v. 
United States 
Dear Byron: 
With your leave I may add a few inconsequential 
comments, concurring, along the following lines : 
I join fully in the Court's opinion, but it may be useful 
to note that the scope of the Court's holding today does not begin 
to approach the sweeping dimensions attributed to it by the dissent . 
Regulations must , of necessity , often be cast in general terms, cf. 
Mourning v. Family, U.S . (dec. 5 / __ / 73 ). Indeed, 
this is so of the Constitution in many of its provisions. The Fourth 
Amendment itself uses general terms in adopting ''reasonableness" 
as its test. Reasonably regarded, the regulation in question here 
was obviously made to reach the problems described by Mr . Justice 
White in relation to borders which extend thousands of miles through 
trackless forests or, as here, literally uninhabited desert space; the 
government disclaims any purpose of applying them in inhabited areas. 
The framers of the Fourth Amendment were farsighted and 
perceptive enough to speak in common sense terms that could be 
applied to a wide variety of particular situations . An extended search 
of the kind contested here could not survive the test of "reasonableness" 
if it took place in Boston, New York, or Washington, although these 
cities are within 20 miles of a sea border. To speculate that the 
Court's holding will open the door to wholesale stopping of cars within 
a range of 100 miles from every border and port of entry is idle 
hyperbole. It is the extensive , sparsely settled border lands to the 
north and south of the United States that are particularly susceptible 
- 2 -
to the widespread alien smuggling alluded to in the Court's 
opinion and which require the extended border searches whose 
reasonableness is today sustained. I._/ To posit a "parade of 
horribles," such as sweeping searches in a large border city --
El Paso, Texas, for example -- is to assume that federal judges 
will overlook what Mr. Justice Black said so often, that "reasonable" 
under the Fourth Amendment, means "reasonable" under all the 
circumstances --time, place, setting and surroundings. In the 
words of Mr. Justice Black: 
Our Government is founded upon a written 
Constitution. The draftsmen expressed themselves 
in careful and measured terms corresponding with 
the immense importance of the powers delegated to 
them. The Framers of the Constitution, and the 
people who adopted it, must be understood to have 
used words in their natural meaning, and to have 
intended what they said . 
[T]he Fourth Amendment does not require 
that every search be made pursuant to a warrant . 
It prohibits only "unreasonable searches and seizures . 11 
The relevant test is not the reasonableness of the 
opportunity to procure a warrant , but the reason-
ableness of the seizure under all the circumstances . 
The test of reasonableness cannot be fixed by per se 
rules ; each case must be decided o n its facts . Coolidge 
v . New Hampshire, 403 U . S . 443 , 500, 509 - 510 . 
(Concurring and dissenting opinion) (19 7 1) . 
It may be that your contemplated revisions or Potter's, if he 
chooses to respond, will render my c omments totally superfluous . 
Regards , 
Mr . Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
]j 
We can judicially notice, from the reported cases in the federal 
courts, the extraordinary ingenuity - - and cruelty -- of the devices 
used to smuggle aliens in empty border regions , including concealing 
then1 in the franJ.es, tanks, and under tho hoods of car a. 
CHAMBERS OF 
»u: r..:uu ~lt.Uli of t4t · ub- f§ aftg 
1fag1ytnghtn. ~. <!}. 2ll.;tJL.~ 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE May 9, 1973 
Re: No. 71-6278 - Condrado Almeida-Sanchez v. 
United States 
Dear Byron: 
With your leave I may add a few inconsequential 
comments, concurring, along the following lines: 
I join fully in the Court 1s opinion, but it may be useful 
to note that the scope of the Court 1 s holding today does not begin 
to approach the sweeping dimensions attributed to it by the dissent. 
Re gulations must, of necessity, often be cast in general terms, c£. 
Mourning v. Family, U.S. (dec. 5/ __ /73). Indeed, 
this is so of the Constitution in many of its provisions. The Fourth 
Amendment itself uses general terms in adopting "reasonableness" 
as its test. Reasonably regarded, the regulation in question here 
was obviously made to reach the problems described by Mr. Justice 
White in relation to borders which extend thousands of miles through 
trackless forests or, as here, literally uninhabited desert space; the 
government disclaims any purpose of applying them in inhabited areas. 
The framers of the Fourth Amendment were farsighted and 
perceptive enough to speak in common sense terms that could be 
applied to a wide variety of particular situations. An extended search 
of the kind contested here could not survive the test of "reasonableness" 
if it took place in Boston, New York, or Washington, although these 
cities are within 20 miles of a sea border. To speculate that the 
Court 1 s holding will open the door to wholesale stopping of cars within 
a range of 100 miles from every border and port of entry is idle 
hyperbole. It is the extensive, sparsely settled border lands to the 
north and south of the United States that are particularly susceptible 
- 2 -
to the widespread alien smuggling alluded to in the Court 1 s 
opinion and which require the extended border searches whose 
reasonableness is torlay sustained.l/ To posit a "parade of 
horribles, 11 sue as sweeping searches in a large border city --
El Paso, Texas, for example -- is to assume that federal judges 
will overlook what Mr . Justice Black said so often, that 11 reasonable 11 
under the Fourth Amendment, means 11 reasonable 11 under all the 
circumstances --time, place, setting and surroundings . In the 
words of Mr. Justice Black: 
Our Government is founded upon a written 
Constitution. The draftsmen expressed themselves 
in careful and measured terms corresponding with 
the immense importance of the powers delegated to 
them. The Framers of the Constitution, and the 
people who adopted it, must be understood to have 
used words in their natural meaning, and to have 
intended what they said . 
[T]he Fourth Amendment does not require 
that every search be made pursuant to a warrant. 
It prohibits only "unreasonable searches and seizures . 11 
The relevant test is not the reasonableness of the 
opportunity to procure a warrant , but the reason-
ableness of the seizure under all the circumstances . 
The test of reasonableness cannot be fixed by per se 
rules; each case must be decided on its facts . Coolidge 
v. New Hampshire, 403 U . S . 443 , 500 , 509 - 510 . 
(Concurring and dissenting opinion) (1971 ). 
It may be that y our contemplated revisions or P otter 1s, if he 
chooses to respond, will render my comments totally superfluous . 
Regards , 
Mr . Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
}j 
We can judicially notice, from the reported cases in the federal 
courts, the extraordinary ingenuity - - and cruelty -- of the devices 
used to smuggle aliens in empty border regions, including concealing 
then'l in the frames, tanks , and under the hoods of cars . 
'. 
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..JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
~nprtutt <qcurt cf tqt 'J!ittittb .ita±tll 
~agftinghm. ~. <q. 2llbl'~~ 
May 10, 1973 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: No. 71-6278, Almeida-Sanchez v. United States 
To my dissenting opinion in this case I plan 
to add the following at an appropriate place in text or 
footnote: 
The Court's opinion today devot~s more 
than four pages to a discussion of the de-
cisions of three Courts of Appeals that 
are said to support the conclusion reached 
by the Court. But I had always supposed 
that it was this Court's precedents that we 
were to follow in interpreting the Constitution. 
ft·~ 7 
To: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Douglas 
Mr. Justtce Brennan 
Mr. Just:Lce V/hi te 
Mr . Just:ice ~.~arshall 
Mr. Justlce Blackmon 
3rd DRAFT l,)ff · Justice Powell 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
From: Stewart, J. 
No. 71-6278 Circulated: -------
Condrado Almeida-Sanchez,) On Writ of Certiorari ~iroulatedMAY 
Petitioner, the United States Court 
· v. of Appeals for the Ninth 
United States. Circuit. 
[May - , 1973] 
MR. JusTICE STEWART, dissenting. 
I agree with the Court that "the power of the National 
Government to exclude aliens from the country is un-
doubted and sweeping." I agree too that this power can 
be effectuated by routine inspections and searches of 
individuals or conveyances seeking to cross our border. 
I also assume that such inspections and searches, to be 
valid, need not take place precisely at the border itself, -but may be conducted at the functional equivalent of 
the border. But none of these propositions, alone or 
together, can support the search of the petitioner's auto-
mobile in this case. That search, in my view, was in 
goss violation of th<' Fourth Amendment to the 
• onstitution. 
The basic facts in this case are neither complicated nor 
disputed. The petitioner was stopped by the Border 
Patrol on State Highway 78 in California, and his car 
was thoroughly searched. The road is essentially an 
east-west highway that runs for part of its course through 
an undeveloped region. At about the point where the 
petitioner was stopped the road meanders north as well 
as east--;-but nowhere does the road reach the Mexicau 
border, and at all points it lies north of Interstate 80, 
a major east-west highway entirely within the United 
States that connects the Southwest with the west coast. 
The petitioner was some 25 air miles north of the border 
11 1973 
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when he was stopped. It is undenied that there was 
no probable cause of any kind for the stop or the sub-
sequent search-not even the "reasonable suspicion'" 
found sufficient for a street detention and weapons search 
in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, and Adams v. Williams, 407 
U.S. 143. 
The Border Patrol conducts three types of surveillanee ~ .f"'-1 ~ 
along inland roadways, all in thE' asserted interest of 
detecting the illegal importation of aliens. ! ~ermanent 
checkp ints are maintained at certain nodal intersee-
tions;J temporary checkpoints are established fro time 
to time at various places; and finally, there are roving-
patrols such as the one that stopped and searched the 
petitioner's car. In all of these operations, it is arguea, 
the agents are acting within the Constitution when they 
stop and search automobiles without a warrant, without 
probable cause to believe the cars contain aliens, and 
even without probable cause to believe the cars have-
made a border crossing. The only asserted justification 
for this extravagant license to search is § 287 (a) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U. S. C. § 1357 (a) , 
which simply provides for warrantless searches of auto-
mobiles and other conveyances "within a reasonable dis-
tance from any external boundary of the United States," 
as authorized by regulations to be promulgated by thf;! 
Attorney General. The Attorney General 's regulation, 
8 CFR ~ 287.1 , defines "reasonable distance '' as "within 
100 air miles from any external boundary of the 
United States. '' A quick glance at a map of this 
country will indicate just how· many populated areas are· 
within 100 miles of an external boundary. It might 
come as a surprise to residents and visitors in the City 
of Washington, D. C., for example, to learn that there 0-b-.J.-~~.._.:J-
are a stat~and regulation purporting to authorize 




ALMEIDA-SANCHEZ v . UNITED STATES 3 
on the streets of this city at any time and with no prob-
able cause, in alleged pursuit of illegally entered aliens. 
I 
No claim is made. nor could one be, that the search of 
the petitioner's car was constitutional under any previous 
decision of this Court involving the search of an automo-
bile. It is settled, of course, that a stop and search of a 
moving automobile can be made without a warrant. 
That narrow exception to the warrant requirement was 
first established in Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 
132. The Court in Carroll approved a portion of the 
Volstead Act providing for warrantless searches of auto-
mobiles when there was probable cause to believe they 
contained ' l1legiil alcoholic beverages. The Court recog-
nize(] that a moving automobile on the open road presents 
a situation "where it is not practicable to secure a war-
rant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the 
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be 
sought." 267 U. S., at 153. Carroll has been followed 
in a line of subsequent cases, 1 but the Carroll doctrine 
does not declare a field day for the police in searching 
automobiles. Automobile or no automobile, there must 
be probable cause for the search. 2 As MR. JusTICE 
WHITE wrote for the Court in Chambers v. Maroney, 39!} 
U. A. 42, 51, "In enforcing the Fourth Amendment's 
1 E. g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42; Dyke v. Taylor Im-
plemeut Mfg. Co., :391 U. S. 216; Brinegar v. United States, 388 
U. S. 160 ; Rusty v. Umted States, :282 U. S. 694. 
2 Moreover, "neither Carroll, supra, nor other cases 111 this Court 
require or suggest that m ever~· conceivable cncum~tancc the search 
of an auto even wJth probable cau~e may be made without the extra 
proterhon for pnvary that a warrant afford~." Chambers v. 
Maroney, :399 U. S., at 50. 8ee alRo Coolidge v New Hampshire, 
40:3 U S. 443, 45R--464, 
71-6278-DfSSENT 
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prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures1 
the Court has insisted upon probable cause as a mini-
mum requirement for a reasonable search permitted by 
the Constitution." 
In seeking a rationale for the validity of the search in 
this case, the Court thus understandably sidesteps the 
automobile search cases. Instead, the Court turns to 
cases dealing with administrative inspections. But these 
cases provide no firmer support for the extraordinary re-
sult the Court reaches today." In Camara v. Municipal 
Court, 387 U. S. 523, the Court held that administrative· 
inspections to enforce community health and welfare 
regulations could be made on less than probable cause 
to believe that particular dwellings were the sites of par-
ticular violations. I d., at 534-536, 538. Yet the Court 
insisted that the inspector obtain either consent or a war-
rant supported by particular physical and demographic 
characteristics of the areas to be searched. Ibid. See 
also See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541. Unlike the 
inspection in Camara, however, the search in this case 
was for evidence of a crime. Cf. ·id., at 534-539. 
Moreover, it was conducted in the unfettered discretion 
of the members of the Border Patrol, who did not have 
a warrant, probable cause, or consent. The search thus 
embodied precisely the evil the Court saw in Camara 
when it insisted that the "discretion of the official in 
the field" be circumscribed by obtaining a warrant prior 
to the inspection. ld., at 532-533. 
Two other administrative inspection cases relied upon 
by the Court today are equally inapposite. Colonnade· 
3 It is to be noted that thi::; case does not mvolve the doctrine of 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, let alone that of Kaufman v. United 
States, 394 U S. 217. The exclu::;ionary rule applicable here was 




ALMEIDA-SANC:H:EZ v. UNITED STATES !5 
Catering Corporation v. United States, 397 U. S. 72, 
and United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, both approved 
warrantless inspections of commercial enterprises en-
gaged in businesses closely regulated and licensed by the 
Government. In Colonnade, the Court stressed the long 
history of federal regulation and taxation of the manu-
facture and sale of liquor, 397 U.S., at 76-77. In Biswell, 
the Court noted the pervasive system of regulation and 
reporting imposed on licensed gun dealers, 406 U. S., at 
312 n. 1, 315-316. 
A central difference between those cases and this one 
is that businessmen engaged in such federally licensed 
and regulated enterprises accept the burdens as well as 
the benefits of their trade, whereas the petitioner here 
was not engaged in any regulated or licensed business. 
The businessman in a regulated industry in effect con-
sents to the restrictions placed upon him. MR. JusTICE 
WHITE, speaking for the Court in Biswell, explained the 
difference between that case and the case before us with 
precision : 
"It is also plain that inspections for compliance 
with the Gun Control Act pose only limited threats 
to the dealer's justifiable expectations of privacy. 
When a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively 
regulated business and to accept a federal license, 
he does so with the knowledge that his business 
records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject to 
effective inspection. Each licensee is annually fur-
nished with a revised compilation of ordinances that 
describe his obligations and define the inspector's 
authority . . . . The dealer is not left to wonder 
about the purposes of the inspector or the limits of 
his task." United States v. Biswell, 406 U. S., at 
:no. 
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In Colonnade and BisweU, the searching officers knew 
with certainty that the premises searched were in fact 
utilized for the sale of liquor or guns. In the present 
case, by contrast. there was no such assurance that the 
individual searchf>d was within the proper scope of offi-
cial scrutiny-that is, there was no reason whatever to 
believe that he or his automobile had even crossed the 
border, much less that he was guilty of the commission 
of an offense. 
II 
Since neither this Court's automobile search decisions 
nor its administrative inspection decisions provide any 
support for the constitutionality of the stop and search 
in the present case,' we are left simply with the statute 
that purports to authorize automobiles to be stopped and 
searched "within a reasonable distance from any external 
boundary of the United States." .; And it is upon this 
statute that the Court today seems ultimately to fasten 
in reaching its decision . The syllogism seems to be that 
the Fourth Amendment prevents only "unreasonable" 
searches and seizures, that Congress has authorized 
searches only within a "reasonable" distance from the 
border, that 25 miles is a "reasonable distance," and 
ergo that this search without probable cause was valid 
under the Fourth Amendment. This strikes me as an 
extraordinary piece of constitutional logic, and a com-
plete abdication of the duty of judicial review. While I 
am familiar with the principle that judges should con-
1 The Court·~ opinion tocht)' devote~ more than four page;; to· \ 
a discus~10n of the cleci~ion;. of thrrr rourto; of appeal:,; that are 
sa id to support it ~ romlu~ion. Bul I bad alwa)·o; ;;uppo~ecl that 
it was this Court ·~ prc·reclent~ tha l we wrre to follow in intrrprcting 
the Constitution . 
5 The Court profe~sr~ not to rei)· on tbr implementin~ regulation 
of the Attorney Genrral that authorizes any search of a vehicle for 
aliens wi_thin 100 mile::; of the borqrr;. 
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!3true a statute so as to avoid a constitutional question; 
the Court in this case seems to embrace the notion that 
it must construe the Constitution so as to avoid a statu-
tory question. I had thought it settled since Marbury 
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, that the existence of a con-
gressional enactment is only the starting point of con-
stitutional analysis, not its conclusion. 
I have no doubt that t~tatute in question could be 
construed and applied constitutionally. For example, 
searches at an e§tablished station near the border, at a 
point marking the confluence of two or more roads all 
extending from the border, might be the functional 
equivalent of border searches. For another example, 
a search of the passengers and cargo of an a!rplane arriv-
ing at a St. Louis airport after a nonstop flight from 
Mexico City would clearly be the functional equivalent 
of a border search." 
But the search of the petitioner's automobile by the 
roving patrol in this case, on a California road that lies 
at all points at least 20 miles north of the Mexican border, 
was of a wholly different order. And no Act of Con-
gress could, in my opinion, make this ;earCh constitlJ,.-- . tionally valid. I have no doubt that Congress considers 
the problem of enforcing the immigration laws to be a 
serious one,7 and that officials charged with enforcement 
6 With rp~prct to aircraft, 8 CFR §281.1 defines "reasonable 
distance" as "any distance fixed pursuant to paragraph (b) of this 
section." Paragraph (b) authorizes the Commissioner of Immigra-
tion and Naturalization to approve ;;earches at a greatpr distance 
than 100 air miles from a border "becaul:le of unusual circumstances." 
7 Though the Government ha;; repeatedly conceded that contra-
band ;;carche~ could not be conducted without probable cause, I 
·er nothmg m the reasoning adoptPd today that would prrvent 
CongrPSi:l from enactin11: a legi:slntivP authorizatiOn for sParches with-
out probablE' cause for illegally unported narcotics or other con-
traband. The problrm::; for lnw rnforcement arc at least as great, 
~ince any alien who could walk acro~s a border and get into a 
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of those laws are faced with a difficult task. 8 But such 
considerations have not in the past led this Court to 
disregard the Constitution.9 
The Court that decided Carroll v. United States, 267 
U. S. 132, sat during a period in our history when the 
Nation was confronted with a law enforcement problem 
of no small magnitude-the enforcement of the Prohibi-
tion laws. But that Court did not turn its back on the 
Fourth Amendment. Chief Justice Taft's opinion for 
the Court in that case clearly controls the case at bar: 
"It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a 
prohibition agent were authorized to stop every 
automobile on the chance of finding liquor and thus 
subject all persons lawfully using the highways to 
the inconvenience and mdignity of such a search. 
Travellers may be so stopped in crossing an inter-
national boundary because of national self-protection 
reasonably requiring one entering the country to 
identify himself as entitled to come in, and his be-
8 The Government rcpre~ent~ that the highwny on which thi~ 
search occurred 1~ a common route for illegally entered aliens to 
travel, and that roving pat rul~ apprehended 192 alienti on that road 
in one year. But it i~ of cuur~e quite possible that every one of 
those aliens wa~ apprehended a~; a re;;ult of a valid ~earch made upon 
probable cause. On the other hand, there i:; no telling how many 
perfectly innocent drivers have bern ~topped on thi~ road without 
any probable cau::;e, and been snbjrcted to a :;earch in the trunks, 
under the hood~, and behind thr rear ~eat~ of the1r automobiles. 
9 La t Term, for example, W(' were a,;ked to hold that the Fourth 
Amendment wa:; no bar to warrantless Plectronic ~urveillance of per-
sons thought to bP subv('r::;ive~ who~e activities threatened national 
security. The claim in United States v. United States Dist1·ict Court, 
407 U. S. 297, wa~ not that ~uch :,;urveillance wns permi~sible with-
out probable cause, but only that the burden of securing judicial 
approval was too grPat. The Court rejrcted this clmm, noting that 
,, r ajlthough some added burdrn will be Imposrd on thr AttornPy 
Grneral, thi~ inconveniencE' is justified m a free society to protect 
.constitutional values.'' 407 U. S., at 321 . 
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longings as 0ffects which may be lawfully brought 
111. But those lawfully within the country. entitled 
to use the public highways, have a right to free pas-
sage without interruption or search unless there is 
known to a competent official authorized to search. 
probable cause for believing that their vehicles are 
carrying contraband or illegal merchandise." 267 
U. S .. at 154.''' 
Carroll has been the law for almost 50 years. I would 
follow it and reverse th<' ,1udgment before us. 
1 0 ThP members of t hP Carroll Court were' hardly men known a~ 
impractical theorists. Chief .Ju ::;tice Taft 's opimon for the Court 
was subscribed to by Mr. Jwstice McKenna. Mr. Justice Holmes. 
Mr. Justice VanDevanter, Mr . .Tuo;ti cP BrandC'Ii:l, Mr . .Justice Butler, 
and Mr .. Justice Sanford . Mr . .Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice 
Sutherland dissented upon the ground tha1 the Court had departed 
too far from the command~ of the Fourth AmendmPnt 
j;u.prrmc ~onrt of tire 'Jlnitc~ ~tate a 
~a:sfrinuton. !:3. <!J. 20gi)l-~ 
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~..~ cl) 
William 0. Douglas 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
cc: The Conference 
.ittpttntt <!):ttttrt of tJrt 'Jttttittb .:%tufts 
2Jlagltittgton. ;!D. <!J. 20~J.t.;1 
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MR. JUSTICE PO\~LL, concurring in the result. 
~ 
I 
As my views of -the case and resolution of the problem involved 
differ .-a-.s•• -•t•nltl from those expressed in the opinion of the Court, I J 
find it necessary to state these views in some detail. We are confronted 
here with the all too familiar necessity of reconciling a legitimate need 
of government with constitutionally protected rights. There can be no 
question as to the seriousness and legitimacy of the law enforcement 
problem with respect to enforcing along thousands of miles of open 
\ border valid immigration and related laws. Nor can there be any l 
question as to the necessity, in.... our free society, of safeguarding 
persons against searches and seizures proscribed by the Fourth 
Amendment. I believe that a resolution of the issue raised by this 
. ~&. 
case is possible with due recognition of both of thes~ in a.__, 
I 




The search here involved was carried out as part of a 
roving search of automobiles in an area generally proximate to 
the Mexican border. It was not a border search, nor can it fairly 
be said to have been a search conducted at the "functional equivalent" 
of the border. Nor does this c3;se involve the constitutional propriety 
of searches at permanent or temporary check points removed from 
the border or its functional equivalent. Nor, finally, was the 
search based on cause in the ordinary sense of specific knowledge 
~ 
concerning an automobile or its passengers. The question posed, 
rather, is whether and under what circumstances the Border Patrol 
may lawfully conduct roving searches of automobiles in areas not 
far removed from the border for the purpose of apprehending aliens 
illegally entering or in the country. 
3. 
The Government has made a convincing showing that large 
numbers of aliens cross our borders illegally at places other than 
established crossing points, that they are often assisted by smugglers, 
that even those who cross on foot are met and transported to their 
destinations by automobiles, and that roving checks of automobiles 
are the only feasible means of apprehending them. It would, of 
course, be wholly impracticable to maintain a constant patrol 
along thousands of miles of border. Moreover, because many of 
these aliens cross the border on foot, or at places other than 
established checkpoints, it is simply not possible in most cases 
for the Government to obtain specific knowledge that a person 
riding or stowed in an automobile is an alien illegally in the 




The Governmentt 's argument to sustain the 
search here is simply that the search was reasonable 
under the circumstances. But it is by now axiomatic 
that the Fourth Amendment's proscription of "unreasonable 
searches and seizures" is to be read in conjunction 
with its command that "no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause." Under our cases, both 
the concept of probable cause and the requirement 
of a warrant bear on the reasonableness of a 
search, though in certain limited • circumstances, 
0 
neither is required. The prRlem of ascertaining the meaning 
----~o~f_t~h~e~, k~c==============---------------------____ 1[ __ __ 
l 
I 
probable cause requirement in the context of roving 
searches of the sort conducted here is measurably 
assisted by the Court's opinion in Camara v. Mun.icipal 
Court, 387 u.s. 523(1967), on which the Government 
relies heavily. The Court was there conc~d with the 
nature of the probable cause requirement in the 
context of searches to identify housing code violations• 
a~d was persuaded that the only workable 
method of enforcement was periodic inspection of 
all structures: 
"It is here that the probable cause debate is 
focused, for the agency's decision to conduct an 
area inspection is unavoidably based on its 
appraisal of conditions in the area as a whole, 
not on its knowledge of conditions in each 




In concluding that such general knowledge met the probable cause 
requirement under those circumstances, the Court took note of a 
"long history of judicial and public acceptance", of the absence of 
other methods for vindicating the public interest in preventing or 
abating dangerous conditions, and of the limited invasion of privacy 
occasioned by inspections which are "neither personal in nature nor 
aimed at discovery of evidence of crime". Id., at 537. 
~ 
for aliens, 
Roving automobile searches in border region 
been consistently approved by the judiciary. While the question is 
1\ 
one of first impression in this fourt, such searche haveJ uniformli{ 
\{«t i tAt" e,J / 
beeniJipTm 1 iiCby the courts of appeals whose jurisdictions include 
those areas of the border between Mexico and the United States where 
the problem has been most severe. See, ~· ~· , 
Its liMLBdA811Xh I HDPQNPPO ·r iuorbf8JCfzdir%89f§tfuj ozili)t&U 
United States v. Miranda , 426 F.2d 283(CA 9 1970): 
Roa-Rodriguez v . United Seces , 410 F.2d 1206(CA 10 1969) . 
Moreover, as noted above , no alternative solution 
is reasonabley possible . 
6. 
More troublesome is the problem of determining the extent 
to which such searches invade the privacy of those whose automobiles 
are searched. It is said that only 3% of aliens apprehended in this 
country are prosecuted. The Government therefore argues that such 
searches are conducted primarily for administrative rather than 
prosecutorial purposes, that their function is simply to locate those 
who are illegally here and to deport them. Brief for the United 
States, p. 28 n. 25. While this contention offers no great solace 
to the innocent whose automobiles are searched or to the few who 
are prosecuted, it does serve to differentiate this class of searches 
from random area searches which are no more than "fishing 
expeditions" for evidence to support prosecutions. Nor does the 
possibility of prosecution distinguish such searches from the searches 
involved in Camara. Despite the Court's assertion in that case 
7. 
that the searches were not "aimed at the discovery of crime", 387 
U.S. , at 537, violators of the housing code there were subject 
to criminal penalties. Id. , at 523 n. 2. 
Of perhaps greater weight is the fact that these searches , 
according to the Government, are conducted in areas where the 
concentration of illegally-present aliens is high, both in absoluta 
terms and in proportion to the number of persons legally present. While 
these searches are not border searches in the conventional sense, 
they are incidental to the protection of the border and draw a large 
measure of justification from the Government's extraordinary 
responsibilities and powers with respect to the border. Finally, and 
significantly, these are searches of automobiles rather than searches of 
persons or buildings. The search of an automobile is far less intrusive 
on the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment than the search of one's 
person or of a building. This Court "has long distinguished between an 
automobile and a home or office." Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 
48 (1970). As the Government has demonstrated, and as those in the 
affected areas surely know, it is the automobile which in most cases 
makes effective the attempts to smuggle aliens into this country. 
... 
The conjunction of these factors--consistent 
judicial approval, absence of a reasonable alternative 
a, a~.,__ 
for the solution of~ lUi: ilq r'i&tK: problem, and only 
a modest intrustion on those whose automobiles 
are searches--persuades me that under appropriate 
limiting circumstances there may exist constitutionally-
adequate probable cause to conduct roving vehicular 
searches in border areas. 
9. 
III 
The conclusion that there may be probable cause to conduct 
roving searches does not end the inquiry, for "except in certain 
carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property 
without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized 
by a valid search warrant." Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, 387 
clause reflects an important policy determination: "The Fourth 
Amendment does not contemplate the executive officers of Govern-
ment as neutral and disinterested magistrates. Their duty and 
responsibility is to enforce the laws, to investigate and to prosecute. 
. . . But those charged with this investigative and prosecutorial 
duty should not be the sole judges of when to utilize constitutionally 
sensitive means in pursuing their tasks. " United States v. United 
States District Court, Yo7 U.S. ~tfl, 111 (1972). See also, 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 491 (1971); Chime! v. 
J \'9 
California, 395 U.S. 752, 76'1-:'76'! (1969). 
.J 
10. 
To justify warrantless searches in circumstances like those 
of this Court's decisions recognizing exceptions to the warrant 
requirement. A brief review of the nature of each of these major 
exceptions illuminates the relevant considerations in the present 
case. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court held that 
a policeman may conduct a limited "pat down" search for weapons 
when/he has reasonable grounds for believing that criminal conduct 
has taken or is taking place and that the person he searches is armed 
and dangerous. "The sole justification [for such a] search ... is 
the protection of the police officer and others nearby .... " 392 
U.S., at 29. Nothing in Terry supports an exception to the warrant 
requirement here. 
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U. S. 72 
(1970), and United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), on 
which the Government also relies, both concerned the standards 








federal licenses to engage in the sale of liquor, Colonnade, or the 
sale of guns, Biswell. In those cases, Congress was held to have 
power to authorize warrantless searches. As the Court stated in 
Biswell: 
'When a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively 
regulated business and to accept a federal license, he 
does so with the knowledge that his business records, 
firearms, and ammunition will be subject to effective 
inspection. '' 406 U. S. , at 316. 
~L 
Colonnade and Biswell cannot fairly be • • ' d to cover cases of 
~~,.~1'1 
present type. One who travels in regions near the borders of the 
" 
country can hardly be thought to have submitted to inspections in 
l 
exchange for a special perquisite. jLl-----------.,,~ 
More closely in point on their facts are the cases · involving 
automobile searches. ~· ~·, Carroll v. United states, 267 u.s. 132 
(19JJ'); Chambers v. Maroney, supra; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
supra. But while those cases allow automobiles to be searched 
. . . j:J 1-< <"'- " (' 
Without a warrant m certam circumstances, the rationale for this \ 
exception to the warrant clause is that under those circumstances 
"it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can 1 
1 
12. 
be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the 
warrant must be sought. " Carroll v. United States, supra, 267 U.S.> 
at 153. The Court today correctly points out that a warrantless 
search under the Carroll line of cases must be supported by probable 
cause in the sense of specific knowledge about a particular automobile. 
While, as indicated above, my view is that on appropriate 
search in a border area without possessing information about 
requirement is inapposite. The very fact that the Government's 
supporting information relates to criminal activity._ certain 
?1. -.' 
zt s* ' 1 6 d rather than to evidence about a particular 
automobile renders irrelevant the justification for warrantless 
searches relied upon in Carroll and its progeny. Quite simply 
the roving searches are justified by experience with obviously 
e<-p ' 'ff- .Q_ ~ ~LU.I:'V ~::;.v~.-v- ,._~ 
~~~f...., tJ~ non-mobile sections of 
1
k · d If g ij '' 
t 
None of the foregoing exceptions to the warrant requirement, 
then, applies to roving automobile searches in border areas. 
\ 
Q f'.f,,:~ • .J,,/el y 
Moreover, the propriety of the warrant procedure here is 1 16" 1 d 
C".5ftfc /,(,jJ.~t/ .ff!*~ .f&o :[C!'e 1/, c~ff o-f S'eo. f/~ I l"l!, C). f . .j"l./1 (/9 '~ 
• 
y Camara. For the reasons outlined above, the Court there ruled 
\.s/.o~" ~ 
that probable cause could beg*? n•t for an area search, but 
nonetheless required that a warrant be obtained for unconsented 
searches. The Court •n•: • indicated its general approach to 
exceptions to the warrant requirement: 
"In assessing whether the public interest demands 
creation of a general exception to the warrant 
requirement, the question is not whether the public 
interest justifies the type of search in quffition, but 
whether the authority to search should be evidenced 
by a warrant, which in turn depends in part upon 
whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely 
to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the 
search. " Jilllc 387 U. S., at 533. 
See also United States v. United States District Court, supra, 407 
u. s.J at 315. 
l 
..... 14 • 
The Government argues that Camara and See are 
distinguishable from the present case for the 
purposes of the warrant requirement. It is true 
that while a building inspector who is refused 
admission to a building may easily obtain 
a warrant to search that building, a member of the 
Border Patrol has no such opportunity when he is refused 
n~r. . 
•m~ss~on to inspect an automobile. It is also 
true that the judicial function envisioned in 
Camara extended principally to the details of the 
search rather than to "the basic agency decision to 
canvass and area 1 " 387 u.s., at 532, while the 
judicial function here would necessarily include 
passing on just such a basic decision. 
But it does not follow from these distinctions 
that "no warrant system can be constructed that would 
be feasible and meaningful." Brief for the 
United States, at 36. Nothing ~the papers 




not be feasible for the Border Patrol to obtain advance judicial 
8 ~ 
appr9val of the decision to conduct roving search on a particular 
( . ~ ' 
roa~l According to the Government, the 
incidence of illegal transportation of aliens on certain roads is 
predictable, and the roving searches are apparently planned in 
advance or carried out according to a predetermined schedule. 
a. I -v-/ 
The use ofJ~t procedure 1 1 P I l would surely not "frustrate the 
governmental purpose behind the search." Camara v. Municipal 
Court, supra, 378 U.S., at 533. It would of course entail some 
1 
inconvenience, but- inconvenience has never been thought to be 
€". ;) 
an adequate reason for abrogating the warrant requirement. United 
States v. United States District Court, supra, 407 U.S., at 321. 
''· 
I Although standards for probable cause in the context of this 
case are relatively unstructured ( cf. United States v. .United States [ 
District Court, there are a number of relevant 
factors which would merit consideration: 
they include (i) the frequency 
with which aliens illegally in the country are known or reasonably 
believed to be transported within a particular area; (ii) the proximity 
of the area in question to the border; (iii) the extensiveness and 
geographic characteristics of the area, including the roads therein 
and the extent of their use; and (iv) the probable degree of interference 
with the rights of innocent persons, taking into account the scope 
I . 
' 
of the proposed search, its duration, and the demographic 
J 




In short, the determination of whether a warrant should be 
issued for an area search involves a balancing of the legitimate 
interests of law enforcement with~ ~~mendment rights • /\ . 
This presents the type of delicate question 
of constitutional judgment which ought to be resolved by the Judiciary 
rather than the Executive. In the words of Camara, 
'this is precisely the discretion to invade private 
property which we have consistently circumscribed 
by a requirement that a disinterested party warrant 
the need to search." 387 U.S. at 532-533. 
Nor does the novelty of the problem posed by roving searches 
in border areas undermine the importance of a prior judicial deter-
mination. When faced with a similarly unconventional problem last 
term in United States District Court, supra, we recognized that the 
focus of the search there involved was "less precise than that 
directed against more conventional types of crime," and that 
• "[d]ifferent standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment 
if they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of 
government ... and the protected rights of our citizens." 407 
/-s, 
'1t 
tJ. S.1 at 322-323. Yet we refused to abandon the Fourth Amendment 
commitment to the use of search warrants whenever this is feasible 
with due regard to the interests affected1fFor the reasons stated 
above, I think a rational search warrant procedure is feasible in 
cases of this kind. As no warrant was obtained here, I agree that 
the judgment must be reversed. I express no opinion as to whether 




L. I am in accord with the Court's conclusion that nothing in 
8 U.S. C. § l357(a) or in 8 CFR 287 .l serves to authorize an otherwise 
unconstitutional search. 
2. The Solicitor General's brief in this Court states explicitly 
that "We ... do not take the position that the checking operations are 
justified because the officers have probable cause or even 'reasonable 
suspicion' to believe, with respect to each vehicle checked, that it 
contains an illegal alien. Apart from the reasonableness of establishment 
of the checking operation in this case, there is nothing in the record to 
indicate that the Border Patrol officers had any special or particular 
reason to stop petitioner and examine his car." Brief for the United 
States , pp . 9 -10 . 
3. There is no reason why a judicial officer could not approve where 
2. 
appropriate a series of roving searches over the course of several 
days or weeks. Experience with an initial search or series of searches 
would be highly relevant in considering applications for renewal of 
a warrant. 
4. Depending upon the circumstances, there may be probable cause 
for the search to be authorized only for a designated portion of a 
particular road or such cause may exist for a designated area which may 
contain one or more roads or tracks. Particularly along much of the 
Mexican border, there are vast areas of uninhabited desert and arid land 
which are traversed by few, if any, main roads or highways, but which 
nevertheless may afford opportunities -- by virtue of their isolated 







May 28, 1973 
The Court's opinion sufficiently establishes 
that none of our Fourth Amendment decisions 
supports the search conducted in this case 1 
~ut irllllillllt•• , in my view, liilauailllil••smpiuziax it 
\ so without develop~ 
does *snnaMtkasaL tq an adequate conception of 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment in this 
context , While the iiiMIL I&AJIIRJts 7 pfp • 
mere fact that the Government has a 
serious law enforcement problem does not 
repea 1, pro tanto, the RaznsFuu •6 * ± P'i 
protections of the Fourth Amendment, neither is 
it irrelevant ~ .................. ~~ .. ~ • 
:::A¥163 • ", 




The search tms•tmub& at issue here was 
rn svrtvr carried out as part of a roving search 
of automobiles in an area generally proximate to 
I the Mexican border. The search was not a border 
search, nor was it a search conducted at the 
"functional equivalent"of the border. Toe 
Almeida-Sanchez, page two. 
The Government does not argue that it • rJP 1 • 
paapr l5 eeiidasl! 'CI a conventional border search 
c., e~ hi jJ ro fJ',.. ~ De c • #l el uc.:l t!'-/ 
on the facts of this cas .• the search / 
'-- -----..J .,.,.~1/y l J u 
in the ordinary sense of specific 
knowledge concerning an automobile or its 
passengers. The Solicmtor Generars brief in 
this Court states explicitly that "We • • • 
do not take the position that the checkin~perations 
are justified becaue the officers have probable 
cause or even 'reasonable suspicion ' to believe, 
with respect to each vehicle checked , that it contains 
an illegal alien. Apart from the reasonableness 
of estatllishment of the checking operation in this 
case. there is nothing in the re• cord 
to indicate that the Border Pattrol officers 
had any special k or particular reason to 
stop petitioner and examine his car," Brief 
for the United States , pp. 9-10. - .. .. ... 
propriety 
of searches at permanent checkpoints removed from 
the border or its functional equivalent, 
The question posed by this case , rather, 
is whether and under what circumstances 
A-S, page • three. 
the border patrol may conduct r• oving searches 
of automobiles in areas not far removed f • rom the 
border for fue purpose of apprehending aliens 
illegally in the country. The Government has 
made a persuasive Jii"ij;ini'-aau in this Court 
that large numbers of aliens cross 
certain sections of this country ' s borders 
.-..aasda• illegally ..- at places other than 
established crossing points, tits uhss a 1 them. 
l!!IUIIIf!IBHt!e:el • b; aaeumo\5tlE. to bhlillf ele:stit uti iM 
wa Litts Ed&Wy , that they are often assisted by 
B'¢Qmphj 1 e t o thuiJI eltlbt!i:n&tsE6h& hi 2hL& 66&ilt!i!~ 
that everl!=W/usa,,,. cross on foot are 
transported to their destinations by automobiles, 
and that roving checks of automobiles are 
the apprehending them short of 
maintaining a constant patrol along thous• ands of 
miles of border. ese aliens cross the 
border on foot
1
and away from established 
che~oints, it is simply not possible in most 
cases tzrt••= for the border patrol to obtain 
specific knowledge that a person riding or stowed 




A-S, page four, 
In short, the Government has good reason to believe 
that it has a stati• stically high chance of 
apprehending aliens if it conducts roving checks on 
certain roads at certain times • 
.::0::: 
4-~e- S~arc 4 
s•sr1m was reasonable under the ciracumstances, 
But it is by now axiomatic that the Fourth 
Amendment's proscription of "unreasonable searches 
and seizures" is to be read in conjunction with its 
command that "{w]arrants shall not issue except upon 
~nder our cases ~ 
probable cause". Ji't Rtczz••••imuidi• kki!lX&stsq , trEY¥ 
tlm both the concept of probable cause and 
the requirement of a warrant bear on the reasonablenes 
of a search, though in certain limited c• ircumstances, 
neither is required, ~1~t .. •e~ ... u .. •••••••·~ .. •s••••~n•e~c: 
In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 u.s. 523(1967), 
on which the Government relies heavily, the Court 
r,.-lu~~/ 
was concerned with the~ t ' ff of the probable cause 
requirement in the context of searches to identify 
housing code violations, The Court was persuaded 
that the only workable method of housing code 
was periodic inspection of all structures, 
[ 
! 
A-S, page five. 
"It is here that the probable cause debate is 
focused, for the agency's decision to conduct 
an area inspection is unavoidably based on its 
appraisal of conditions in the area as a 
whole, not on its knowledge of conditions in 
each particular building." 387 u.s., at 536, 
II J J] JiHIIHII ... H&EJ&Xlkk2! i ... IIIH81tl?* g; fr I I ' A )U b bt 
SZ&ild$12 
concluding trnc such general krr.owledge In .... .-MW~~--~------....... --~-.~ 
the probable cause requirement 48•r .... ,............. . 
ua.der those circ~mstances, the Court took 
note of a "long history of judicial and public 
acceptance", of the absenace of other methods 
for vindicating the public interest in preventing 
or abating dangerous conditions, and of the 
limited invasion of privacy occasioned by inspections 
which are "neither personal in nature nor 
aimed at discovery of evidence of crime". 
Id. , at 537. 
,,· 
A-S, page six. 
Roving autof'Tll1o bile searches oHIIJIII!'II!lfkftl!!! in border 
regions ~ have, likewise, been cons~tently approved 
by the j•udiciary. Whixle the question is one of 
first impression in this court, such searches have 
uniformly been approved by the courts of appeals 
who jurisidictions inclu~de those areas of the 
border between ~exico and the United States where the 
problem _. has been most severe. See , e.g, 
Moreover, as noted avove, the problem is one which 
resists solution by other fe• asible means, 
More troublesome is the problem of determining 
the extent to which sue~ searches invade the privacy 
of those whose automobiles are searched, From the fact 
that only 3% of aliens apprehended in this country 
are prosecuted, that such 
9Q IT 
rather 
A-S, page seve 11. 
'to<~~ 
is simply to ~f!I:U~:Chose who are illegally 
0.'1~ 1-D • ot~p~ ,..f- ilt<!-,... .. 
here--c___ 
Brief for the United States, at 28 n, 25, 
While this contention offers no gr•eat solace 
to the innocent whose automobiles are searched 
or to those who are prosecuted, it serves to 
differentiate, to some extent, this class of 
searches from area searches which are noe more than 
"fishing expeditions" for evidence. The fact 
that aliens illegally in the country and those who 
transport of harbor them are subject to prosecution 
does not distinguish such searches from the 
searches invo~ed in Camara, Despite the Court's 
\.'a.. -1 h-.-f us~ .J 
assertion-stszz z. that the searches were not "aimed 
at the discovery of crime", 387 u.s., at 537, 
violators of the housing code there were subject 
to criminal penalties, 
is the fact that such searches are, according to 
the Government, conducted in areas where the 
concentration of illegally-present aliens is very 
high, While these searches are not border searches 
in the conventional sense, they are incidental to 
the protection of the border and draw some measure 
A-S, page eight. 
of justification from the Government's extraordinary 
responsibilities and powers with respect to the 
border, 
Finaljy, and signficantly, these are searches 
of automobiles rather than searches of *--••• 21 
..w persons or buildings, This Court "has long 
distinguished between an automobile and a home or 
office." Chambers v. Maroney, 399 u.s. 42,48 
(19 ). As the Government has demonstrated, 
and as those in the affected areas surely know, 
it is the automobile which in many cases makes 
effective the attempts to .... ~ smuggle aliens into 
this country, 
The conjunction of these factors--consistsnt 
judicial approval, absence of a reasonable alternative 
for the solution of an important problem, 
and only a modest intrusaion on those whose 
automobiles are searched--persuades me that 
uder appropriate circumstances there exists 
constitutionally-adequate probable cause to 
conduct •nsnst 811B t 1 t• 2 E 
searches of the sort conducted in this case. 
\ 
A-S, page nine. 
III. 
The conclusion that there may be probable 
cause to conduct roving searches does not end 
the inquiry, for "except in certain carefully 
defined • caR classes of cases, a search of private 
property without proper consent -. is 'unreasonable' 
unless it has been authorized by a valid search 
warrant." Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, 387 U.S., 
at 528-529, a E • ROll 
contemplate the executive officers of Government 
as neutral and disinterested magistrates. Their 
duty and responisibility is to enforce the • laws, 
1"' 
to investigate and to prosecute ••.• But hose 
~ 
charged with this investigative and prosecutorial 
duty should not be the sole judges of when to 
utilize• constitutio~ly sensitive means in pursuing 
their tasks." United States v. United States 
District Court, u.s. (1972) 
A-S, page ten. 
See alsox Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 
491(1971); Chimel v. California, 395 u.s. 752, 764-765 
( 1969). 
To justify warrantless searches in circumstances 
like those presented in th• is case, the Government 
makes reference "'!t ... lllllli?ili?illllllliF••• a long list of 
this eourt's decisions recognizing exceptions to 
the warrant •••a .... a•••• requirement. A brief review of 
the nature of each of ~or exceptions illuminates 
the relevant considerations in the present case. 
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 u.s. 1(19CI ), the Court held 
that a policeman may conduct a limited "pat down" 
search for weapons when he has reasonable grounds 
for believing that criminal conduct~·-. ... has taken 
--~· or is taking place and that the person he 
searches is armed and dangerous. "The sole 
justification ~Lror such q7 search • • • is 
the protection of the police officer and others 
nearby. • • II 392 u.s., at 29. Nothing in 
Terry supports an exception to the warrant 
25 811 e:at!' 
s1w1j1p s ¥mEt a~&Hli fntm Liill ::hell} 11 p • ·•• .. 
requirement here., 1tBbxxuirnxiPmna•g•a:iln&ita• 
lltlOJI.e 
1!!h8s~ liRO/IIIi:IW!ff II if I CIJCC C: p t" i 7 j A ' i:t f i U A • it!f 
CJ{@Ati?P If diiOI!tz P$ 
A-S, page eleven. 
1111 ........................ Coli onnade 
Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 u.s. 72 
(1970), and United States v. Biswell, ~Ob u,s. ~11 





on which the Government al~ relies, both 
concerned the standards which govern inspections 
of the business pre5mises a£ l z of .......... 
those with federal licenses to engage in 
the sale of liquor, Colonnade, or the sale of 
;:t; ..f).(/)S c Cc:lJ.,-!- G "I .,.. , ., CV(;(. .r 
~illllnrjiiMMitfil kJt&AXlf&AiiWA 
l.eld ~ /.,~ fJt:~w~ -lo O.IJ+It.o.,-t ~e. 
sxpiziiRzdxjzzritianilil The. ratim 11 f thaz•• 
4/~ ,.~ f le s $ S"e.Q. rc.- t.~ s. 
•s•aigjoes, Titil ' an gw warrest 7 1:n se.sict iL. spe 
• , ... 
•w~&'b~@~!X~p~t~t~. s .... l .. t~n Biswell J ... 
"When a dealer chooses to engage in this 
pervasively regulated business and to accept 
a federal license, he does so with the 
knowledge that his busi~ness records, firearms, 
'-"' 
and ammunition will be subject to effective 
inspection," 406 u.s., at 316, 
<' 
A-S, page twelve. 
C~onnade and Biswell cannot fairly be str~hed to 
cover '±mq u&X£1&12& • cases of the present 
type. One who travels in regions near the borders 
of the country can hardly be thought to have 
• submitted to inspections in exchange for 
a special perquisite. 
are the 
More closely in cases 
involving automobile searches. E.g., , 3 · 'II 
~arroll v. United States, 267 u.s. 132(19 ); 
• ryp,.«.; 
Chambers v. Maroney, 4~9~9~ij~u"e~.~----~(~1~,~~)~• Coolidge 
\ .su;~'l • 
v. New Hampshire, ~3 Hu 41• 3(1 a But while 
those cases allow automobiles to be searched 
without a warrant in certain circumstances, the 
rationale for this exception to the warrant 
clause is that under those circumstances "it is 
not practicable to secure a warrant becaase the 
vehicle .. can be quickly moved out of the 
locality & or jurisdiction in which the warratt 
must be sought." Carroll v. United States, supra, --
267 u.s., at 153, seAs the Gwmt 'izdsg r t tts e:W• 
t • ths t 
"e!'ic: police muse ttaee: pra'lual111 •o ••• •• 1 lflfliiB• 
t ntef se;a£ ett. SbitC. SEOts&'lllll 
A-S, page HI_. sa thirteen, 
The Court ar· rss ' 7 7 today correctly points out that 
••IJiiiZL!I!J"ZLLili •••••Jilill? ••I!IIJT••• a warrantless search •zr-
......... 1 • 7 , gtsu1 LZi .._ illl-'-a. - I t"~""'- IZ¢12¢BZ 
un~er the carroll line of cases must be supported 
by probable cause in the •••t•II'•FS.' • sense •* ' sanibttti!Qk 
of specific knnowledge about a particular autommbile. 
While, as indicated above, my view is that 
on appropriate facts the wzzzrzcznL Government -..,. 
can establish probable cause for a roving search in 
a border area without possessing information about 
pari t • icular automobiles, it by no means follows 
that the warrant requirement is inappos• ite, 
. ~pportinsJ 
The very fact that the Government' ~Liana hiformation 
arras rr relates to criminal activity ta on .P••naazm•K 
~ certain stretches of road rather than to 
evidence about a particular automobile renders 
irrelevant the • · vvr i ~ justification for 
warrantless searches .. relied upon in Carroll and its 
progeny, 14!a:idtxxm hER•••• n k M£21111 rut MdLafnlln 
•L&JZAAA!lfkJULAAXAJiitRlibl iftitiiAAAXiiiiAlllbiiHRiiM?PX' I ?fUb&iC 
•••xwmcwfxwwtwwwJsilwwxxnn ruoaali an of da#drarr 
Quite simply, •• •••1 •••ssthlln•sllfilli*•'•s~· •l!lls ••-••••~s,.••u •••·r••••• 
A-S, page fourteen. 
the roving searches are justified by experience with 
obviously non-mobile sections of highway. 
None of the foregoing exceptions to the warrant 
requirement, then, applies to roving automobile 
se~hes in border areas. Moreover, the propriety 
of the warrant procedure here is confirmed 
by Camara. For the ...... reasons outlined above, 
the Court there ruled that probable cause could 
be established for an area sea• rch, ~ut ... 
ts•n•zzsM' ......... w•t•m•r nonetheless required that 
a warrant be obtained for unconsented searches. 
The Court there indicated its 
general approach to ... exceptions to the warrant 
requirement: 
"In assessing whether the public interest 
demands creation of a general exception to 
the warrant requirem~t, the question is 
not whether the publtc interest justifies the 
type of search in question, but whether the authority 
to search should be evidenced by a warrant, 
which in turn depends in part upon whether• 
the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to 
frustrate the governmental purpose behind the 
A-S, page fifteen. 
search." 387 U.S. , at 533. 
See also United S~es v. United S~es Histt rict Court, 
supra, 'fo7 U.S., at 31s-. 
Like the area .._ building inspection searches 
at issue in Camara and See, roving a• utomobile 
searches in border areas are justified by 
accumulated information regarding sections of 
highway. The Government argues that 
k h •1 ; g · n those cases are distinguishalbe 
:&:niZ!s£1 
\ on several grrunds / 
~ 5 I t 2 • from the 
present one for the purposes of the warrant 
requirement. It is true, as the Governement 
contends, that while .. building inspector ~ 
who is refused 
obtain a warrant to search that building, 
a member of the Border Patrol cannot feasibly 
obtain a warrant whenever he is refu• sed perm• ission 
to inspect an auto~obile. Accordingly, -.. 
judicial scrutiny would perforce be limited to 
Ji b p il % IIi . I 7 passing on the general 
propriety of a •HNu.-;~g~ .... .-J proposed roving search. 
'i . 1 ISS 6 j!3 ElM£ ilk Jz:zt• hit f&I£61!Uii 
A-S, page sixteen. 
lfl · -zasr , · I 
It is also true tha~he judicial •w-. ..... function 
envisioned in Camara extended principally to the 
details of the search rather than to "the basic 
agency decision to canvass an..•a•u•-area." 
,t7l 
3J.W u Is If 
at 532, while any judicial function here would 
necessarily concern just 
such a basic decision. 
Despite the Government's assertion to 
the ~ontrary, however, it does not fmllow 
that "no warrant system can be constructed that would 
be feasible and meaningful." Brief for the United 
States, at 36, Nothing in the papers before us 
demonstrates that it would not be feasible 
for the Border Patrol to obtain advance judicial 
approval of the decision to conduct a roving 
search ius t rannir t I 3 on a particular road 
at a particular time. According to the 
Government, the i~ciadence of illegal transportation 
of aliens on certain roads is predictable, and the 
roving searches are apparently plaaned in advance 
or carried out according to a predetermined schedule. 
A-S, page seventeen, 
The use of a procedure of this sort would surely 
not "frustrate the governmental purpose il behind 
the search," Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, 378 
u.s., at 533, It would of course entail some 
in.convenience, but mere inconvenience has neve~ 
been thoug~eqaute reason .. for abrogating 
the warrant requirement. u,.; ft!'rl .rTs. fcs y u,,' 1-.t:J .) t, -k-..s 
o,~ 1,~ 1 eo.,, t .r "e l'q ,-tt a 7 o . .s. J .. + 3;)/. 
Moreover, such screening would in my view 
be meaningful,~; ;::=~£e.;;=:;g~.e;:~~::d,} 
standards for probable cause in this context 
liMllnH••snmrx••~••• are rea latively unstructured. 
Among the :imt:ttanw••rnillrnr••illi&nui relevant factors 
are ¥• trtarrtn Mhrni&ndnn••••q'i£'!Yxmtxyyyyxpsn• nft.M 
the frequency with which aliens illegally in the 
country are transported on a particular stretch of 
the road in 
question to the border, Whether a particular 
incidence of ~ transportation at a particular 
distance from the border is sufficiently a problem 
to justify the invasion of privacy occasioned by 
llli"iiiPil'llil·lll_ -.t'!J.-IRJ•n•n•••••• a roving search .- involves a 
delicate question of constitutional judgment _.a-- ..;lu'c, l 
o"::t..r- +o be r-tr>.sol,r:-J by T~t!! J..,cl,'e,,; 7 ,.,Hte,.. f'lt.o.,. IJ~ . 
in11 .XYXiiMN"@RBiW In the words of Camara, fire. f!!')t(t!!!otJft~..,. 
'< 
A-S, page eighteen. 
"This is precisely the discretion to invade 
private property which we have consistently 
cricumscribed by a requirement that a 
disinterested party warrant the need to 
search." 387 u.s., at 532. -533. 
~ The novelty of the problem posed by roving searches 
in border areas in no way undermines the importance 
of a prior judicial determination. When 
faced with a similarly e& unconventional problem • 
last Term in United States v. United States District 
~vet:..ti.J 
Court, we recognized that the .. v&vstz standards 
1\ 
~ governing electronic surveillance in \jiist~ 
security cases may be less ~¥ .... 1 .. •• precise than 
those ~ ...... ~ controlling surveillance 
. { &f 0 ? 0' .!'.-< 4 : 3 ?-y 
in cases of ordinary cr 1.me , '-:!tn trua • t u -
•Jmlllls••••z•s •r•n••-a-llllfiilfiit••n•lirizlir•••••v•niin~••'•a .. Yet at the s arne 
time we refused to abandon the Fourth Amendment's 
commitment to the use of search warrants wherever 
possible. Because no warrant was obtained here, 
I agree that the 
~ judgment/ . 
Alt a •• 1 must be reversed. 
.. 
CHAMBE RS OF" 
THE CHIEF" JUSTICE 
.:§u.p-rmtt ~Olttt of tqt ~b: .itatts 
'J!Ufaslfinght~ 18. <q. Zll&f)k.;J 
May 30, 1973 
Re: No. 71-6278 - Almeida-Sanchez v. U. S. 
Dear Byr on: 
Please join me in the above and consider 
this "join" withdrawal of my previously circulated 
concurrence. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
-..,..,....-__,.,........,..,..,, .. ""i"' _ _,_ _________ _,...TT'"""'" ,...~ • ..-,....---------,...,-_,..,.. ....... ~,.........~"'!"'-".....,.,...,..,...,..----~ 
·, 
6/4/73 lee wck/ss 
No. 71-6278 Almeida-Sanchez 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL concurring. 
The Court's opinion sufficiently establishes that none of 
our Fourth Amendment decisions supports the search conducted 
in this case, but, in my view, it does so without developing an 
adequate conception of the meaning of the Fourth Amendment in this 
context. While the mere fact that the Government has a serious 
law enforcement problem does not repeal, pro tanto, the protections 
of the Fourth Amendment, neither is it irrelevant. 
I 
The search at issue here was carried out as part of a 
roving search of automobiles in an area generally proximate to 
the Mexican border. The search was not a border search, nor 
was it a search conducted at the "functional equivalent" of the 
border. The Government does not argue that a conventional border 
search on the facts of this case could properly be conducted. Nor 





permanent checkpoints removed from the border or its functional 
equivalent. Nor, finally, was the search based on cause in the 
ordinary sense of specific knowledge concerning an automobile or 
its passengers. The Solicitor General!B brief in this Court states 
explicitly that 'We ..• do not take the position thtlt the o••l113 
checking operations are justified because the officers have probable 
cause or even 'reasonable suspicion' to believe, with respect to 
each vehicle checked, that it contains an illegallltilmlx alient. 
Apart from the reasonJtbleness of establishment of the checking 
operation in this case, there is nothing in the record to indicate 
that the Border Patrol officers had any special or particular reason 
to stop petitioner and examine his car." Brief for the United states, 
pp. 9-10. 
The question posed by this case, rather, is whether and 
under what circumstances the border patrol may conduct roving 
searches of automobiles in areas not far removed from the border 
for the purpose of apprehending alients illegally in the country. 
3. 
The Government has made a persuasive showing in this Court that 
sections of this country's borders illegally at places other than 
established crossing points, that they are often assisted by smugglers, 
that even those who cross on foot are transported to their destinations 
by automobiles, and that roving checks of automobiles are the only 
feasible means of apprehending them short of maintaining a constant 
many 
patrol along thousands of miles of border. BecausE¥ of these Dk 
aliens cross the border on foot, and away from established checkpoints, 
it is simply not possible in most cases for the border patrol to obtain 
specific knowledge that a person riding or stowed in an automobile 
is an alient illegally in the country. In short, the Government 
has good reason to believe that it has a statistically high chance 
of apprehending alients if it conducts roving checks on certain 
roads at certain times. 
4. 
II 
The Government's argument to sustain the search here is 
simply that the search was reasonablJ under the circumstances. 
But it is by now axiomatic that the Fourth Amendment's prosectiption 
of "unreasonable searches and seizures" is to be read in conjunction 
with its command that "[w ]arrants shall not issue , except upon 
probable cause". Under our cases both the concept of probable cause 
and the requirement of a warrant bear on the reasonableness of a 
search, though in certain limited circumstances, neither is required. 
In Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), on which the 
Government relies heavily, the Court was concerned with the nature 
of the probable cause requirement in the context of searches to 
identify housing code violations. The Court was persuaded that the 
only workable method of housing code was periodic inspection of 
all structures. 
"It is here that the probable cause debate is focused, 
for the agency's decision to conduct an area inspection 
is unavoidably based on its appraisal of conditions in 
the area as a whole, not on its knowledge of conditions 
in each particular building. " 387 U. S., at 536. 
5. 
In concluding that such generallmowledge met the probable cause 
requirement under those circumstances, the Court took note of a 
"long history of judicial and public acceptance", of the absence of 
other methods for vindicating the public interest in preventing or 
abating dangerous conditions, and of the limited invasion of privacy 
occasioned by inspections which are "neither personal in nature nor 
aimed at discovery of evidence of crime". ld., at 537. 
Roving automobile searches in border regions have, likewise, 
been consistently approved by the judiciary. While the question is 
one of first impression in this court, such searches have uniformly 
been approved by the courts of appeals whose jurisdictions include 
those areas of the border between Mexico and the United states where 
the problem has been most severe. See, ~· ~· , 
. -
6. 
Moreover, as noted above, the problem is one which resists solution 
by other feasible means. 
More troublesome is the problem of determining the extent 
to which such searches invade the privacy of those whose automobiles 
are searched. From the fact that only 3% of aliens apprehended in 
this country are prosecuted, the Government argues that such searches 
at bottom are condicted for administrative rather than prosecutor1al 
purposes, that their function is simply to locate those who are 
illegally here and to deport them. Brief for the United States, at 
28 n. 25. While this contention offers no great solace to the 
innocent whose automobiles are searched or to those who are 
prosecuted, it serves to differentiate, to some extent, this class 
of searches from area searches which are no more than "fishing 
expeditions" for evidence. The fact that aliens illegally in the 
country and those who transport or harbor them are subject to 
prosecution does not distinguish such searches from the searches 
involved in Camara. Despite the Court's assertion in that case 
, .. 
7. 
that the searches were not "aimed at the discovery of crime", 387 
U.s., at 537, violators of the housing code there were subject 
to criminal penalties. 
Of perhaps more weight is the fact that such searches are, 
according to the Government, conducted in areas where the 
concentration of illegally-present aliens is very high. While 
these searches are not border searches in the conventional sense, 
they are incidental to the protectionof the border and draw some measure 
of justification from the Government's extraordinary responsibilities 
and powers with respect to the border. 
Finally, and significantly, these are searches of automobiles 
rather than searches of persons or buildings. This Court ''has long 
distinguished between an automobile and a home or office. Chambers 
v. ~arC?Jley, 399 U.s. 42, 48 (19 ). As the Government has 
demonstrated, and as those in the affected areas surely lmow, 
1t is the automobile which in many cases makes effective the attempts 
to smuggle aliens k into this country. 
8. 
The conjunction of these factors -consistent judicial approval, 
absence of a reasonable alternative for the solution of an important 
problem, and only a modest intrusion on those whose automobiles 
are searched - persuades me that under appropriate circumstances 
there exists constitutionally-adequate probable cause to conduct 
searches of the sort conducted in this case. 
9. 
m 
The conclusion that there may be probable cause to conduct 
roving searches does not end the inquiry, for "except in certain 
carefully defined classes of eases, a search of private property 
without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless 1t has been authorized 
by a valid search warrant.'' Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, 387 
U. S. at 528, 529. I have recently stated that in my view the warrant 
clause reflects an important policy determination: "The Fourth 
Amendment does not contemplate the executive officers of Govern-
ment as neutral and disinterested magistrates. Their duty and 
responsibility is to enforce the laws, to investigate and to prosecute • 
• • . But those charged with this investigative and prosecutorial 
duty should not be the sole judges of when to utilize constitutionally 
sensitive means in pursuing their tasks." United states v. United 
~at~s D_!strict Coux:!1 __ U.s. _, ___ (1972). See also, 
I 
\ 
gool~~-v. -~ew Ha_~pshire, .. 403 u.S. 443, 491 (1971); Chimel v. 1 
\ 




To justify warrantless searches in circumstances like those 
presented in this case, the government makes reference to a long list 
of this Court's decisions recognizing exceptions to the warrant 
requirement. A brief review of the nature of each of these major 
exceptions illuminates the relevant considerations in the present 
case. In Terr_y v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court held that 
a policeman may conduct a limited "pat down" search for weapons 
when the has reasonable grounds for believing that criminal conduct 
has taken or is taking place and that the person he searches is armed 
and dangerous. "The sole justification [for such a] search . . . is 
the protection of the police officer and others nearby. • . . " 392 
u.s., at 29. Nothing in Terry supports an exception to the warrant 
requirement here. 
Colo~ade Catering Corp. v. United states, 397 U.s. 72 
(1970), and United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), on 
which the Government also relies, both concerned the standards 
which govern inspections of the business premises of those with 
11. 
federal licenses to engage in the sale of liquor, Colonnade, or the 
sale of guns, ~iswell. In those cases, Congress was held to have 
power to authorize warrantless searches. As the Court stated in 
Biswell: 
"When a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively 
regulated business and to accept a federal license, he 
does so with the lmowledge that his business records, 
firearms, and ammunition will be subject to effective 
inspection. " 406 U. S. , at 316. 
Colonnad~ and Biswell cannot fairly be stretched to cover cases of 
present type. One who travels in regions near the borders of the 
country can hardly be thought to have submitted to inspections in 
exchange for a special perquisite. 
More closely in point on their facts are the casesiinvolving 
automobile searches. ~· fi·, Carroll v. United states, 267 u.s. 132 
(19 ); Chambers v. Maroney, ~upra, Coblidge v. New Hampshire, 
supra. But while those cases allow automobiles to be searched 
without a warrant in certain circumstances, the rationale for this 
exception to the warrant clause is that under those circumstances 
"it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can 
12. 
be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdictbm in which the 
warrant must be sought. " Carroll v. United states, supra, 267 U. s. 
at 153. The Court today correctly points out that a warrantless 
search under the Carro_!~ line of cases must be supported by probable 
cause in the sense of specific lmowledge about a particular automobile. 
While, as indicated above, my view is that on appropriate 
facts the Government can establish probable cause for a roving 
search in a border area without possessing information about 
particular automobiles, it by no means follows that the warrant 
requirement is inapposite. The very fact that the Government's 
supporting information relates to criminal activity on certain 
stretches of road rather than to evidence about a particular 
automobile renders irrelevant the justification for warrantless 
searches relied upon in Carroll and its progeny. Quite simply 
the roving searches are justified by experience with obviously 
non-mobile sections of highway. 
13. 
None of the foregoing exceptions to the warrant requirement, 
then, applies to roving automobile searches in border areas. 
Moreover, the propriety of the warrant procedure here is confirmed 
by _9a~3._!'a. For the reasons outlined above, the Court there ruled 
that probable cause could be established for an area search, but 
nonetheless required that a warrant be obtained for unconsented 
searches. The Court there indicated its general approach to 
exceptions to the warrant requirement: 
"In assessing whether the public interest demands 
creation of a general exception to the warrant 
requirement, the question is not whether the public 
interest justifies the type of search in quettion, but 
whether the authority to search should be evidenced 
by a warrant, which in turn depends in part upon 
whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely 
to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the 
search. " 1I9M 387 U. s. , at 533. 
See also UJ!!t~~ States v. United States District Court, supra, 407 
U.S. at 315. 
Like the area building inspection searches at issue in 
C~In:.a~a and Se~, roving automobile searches in border areas are 
justified by accumulated information regarding sections of highway. 
14. 
The Government argues that those cases are distinguishable on 
several grounds from the present one for the purposes of the warrant 
requirement. It is true, as the Government contends, that while a 
building inspector who is refused admission to a building may rather 
easily obtain a warrant to search that building, a member of the 
Border Patrol cannot feasibly obtain a warrant whenever he is 
refused permission to inspect an automobile. Accordingly, judicial 
scrutiny would perforce be limited to passing on the general propriety 
of a proposed roving search. It is also true that the judicial function 
envisioned in Camara extended principally to the details of the search 
rather than to "the basic agency decision to canvass an area." 387 
U.S., at 532, while any judicial function here would necessarily 
concern just such a basic decision. 
Despite the Government's assertion to the contrary, however, 
it does not follow that "no warrant system can be constructed that 
would be feasible and meaningful. " Brief for the United states, 




not be feasible for the Border Patrol to obtain advance judicial 
approval of the decision to conduct a roving search on a particular 
road at a particular time. According to the Government, the 
incidence of illegal transportation of aliens on certain roads is 
predictable, and the roving searches are apparently planned in 
/ 
advance or carried out according to a predetermined schedule. 
The use of a procedure of this sort would surely not "frustrate the 
governmental purpose behind the search." Camara v. Municipal 
Court, ~upra, 378 U.s., at 533. It would of course entail some 
inconvenience, but mere inconvenience has never been thought to be 
an adequate reason for abrogating the warrant requirement. United 
states v. United states District Court, supra, 407 U.S., at 321. 
Moreover, such screening would in my view be meaningful. 
For reasons already discussed, standards for probable cause in this 
context are relatively unstructured. Among the relevant factors 
are the frequency with which aliens illegally in the country are 
transported on a particular stretch of road and the proximity of 
' ' 
16. 
the road in question to the border. Whether a particular incidence 
of transportation at a particular distance from the border is 
sufficiently a problem to justify the invasion of privacy occasioned by 
a roving search involves a delicate question of constitutional judgment 
which ought to be resolved by the judicial rather than by the executive. 
In the words of C~mara, 
"This is precisely the discretion to invade private 
property which we have consistently circumscribed 
by a requirement that a disinterested party warrant 
the need to search. " 387 U.S., at 532-533. 
The novelty of the problem posed by roving searches in border 
areas in no way undermines the importance of a prior judicial 
determination. When faced with a similarly unconventional problem 
last Term in Unit~d States_ v. United States District Court, supra, we 
recognized that the standards governing electronic surveillance in 
domestic security cases may be less precise than those controlling 
surveillance in cases of ordinary crime, 407 U. S. , at 322. Yet at 
the same time we refused to abandon the Fourth Amendment's commit· 
ment to the use of search warrants wherever possible. Because no 




The search here involved was carried out as part of a 
roving search of automobiles in an area generally proximate to 
the Mexican border. It was not a border search, nor can it fairly 
be said to have been a search conducted at the "functional equivalent" 
of the border. Nor does this case involve the constitutional propriety 
of searches at permanent or temporary check points removed from 
the border or its functional equivalent. Nor, finally, was the 
search based on cause in the ordinary sense of specific knowledge 
concerning an automobile or its passengers. The question posed, 
rather, is whether and under what circumstances the Border Patrol 
may lawfully conduct roving searches of automobiles in areas not 
far removed from the border for the purpose of apprehending aliens 
illegally entering or in the country. 
3. 
The Government has made a convincing showing that large 
numbers of aliens cross our borders illegally at places other than 
established crossing points, that they are often assisted by smugglers, 
that even those who cross on foot are met and transported to their 
destinations by automobiles, and that Doving checks of automobiles 
are the only feasible means of apprehending them. It would, of 
course, be wholly impracticable to maintain a constant patrol 
along thousands of miles of border. Moreover, because many of 
these aliens cross the border on foot, or at places other than 
established checkpoints, it is simply not possible in most cases 
for the Government to obtain specific knowledge that a person 
riding or stowed in an automobile is an alien illegally in the 
country. Thus the magnitude of the problem is clear. 
,; . \"'f ... 
7. 
that the searches were not "aimed at the discovery of crime", 387 
U.s. , at 537, violators of the housing code there were subject 
to criminal penalties. ~·, at 523 n.2. 
Of perhaps greater weight is the fact that theee searches , 
according to the Government, are conducted in areas where the 
concentration of illegally-present aliens is high, both in absolute 
terms and in proportion to the number of persons legally present. While 
these searches are not GJorder searches in the conventional sense, 
they are incidental to the protection of the border and draw a large 
measure of justification from the Government's extraordinary 
responsibilities and powers with respect to the border. Finally, and 
significantly, these are searches of automobiles rather than searches of 
persons or buildings. The search of an automobile is far less intrusive 
on the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment than the search of one's 
person or of a building. This Court .,has long distinguished between an 
automobile and a home or office." Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 
48 (1970). As the Government has demonstrated, and as those in the 
affected areas surely lmow, it is the automobile which in most cases 
makes effective the attempts to smuggle aliens into this country. 
FOOTNOTES 
L. I am in accord with the Court's conclusion that nothing in 
8 u.s.c. § 1357(a) or in 8 CFR 287.1 serves to authorize an otherwise 
unconstitutional search. 
2. The Solicitor General's brief in this Court states explicitly 
that ''We ••• do not take the position that the checking operations are 
justified because the officers have probable cause or even 'reasonable 
suspicion' to believe, with respect to each vehicle checked, that it 
contains an illegal alien. Apart from the reasonableness of establishment 
of the checking operation in this case, there is nothing in the record to 
indicate that the Border Patrol officers had any special or particular 
reason to stop petitioner and examine his car." Brief for the United 
States, pp. 9-10. 
3. There is no reason why a judicial officer could not approve where 
2. 
appropriate a series of roving searches over the course of several 
days or weeks. !Experience with an initial search or series of searches 
would be highly relevant in considering applications for renewal of 
a warrant. 
4. Depending upon the circumstances, there may be probable cause 
for the search to be authorized only for a designated portion of a 
particular road or such cause may exist for a designated area which may 
contain one or more roads or tracks. Particularly along much of the 
Mexican border, there are vast areas of uninhabited desert and arid land 
which are traversed by few, if any, main roads or highways, but which 
nevertheless may afford opportunities-- by virtue of their isolated 
character - for the smuggling of aliens. 
I 
lfp/ss lee Rider.(\, p. 1 (Almeida) 6/6/73 
As my views of the case and resolution of the problem involved 
differ somewhat from those expressed in the opinion of the Court, I 
find it necessary to state these views in some detaiL We are confronted 
here with the all too familiar necessity of reconciling a legitimate need 
of government with constitutionally protected rights. There can be no 
question as to the seriousness and legitimacy of the law enforcement 
problem with respect to enforcing along thousands of miles of open 
border valid immigration and related laws. Nor can there be any 
question as to the necessity, in axhx our free society, of safeguardtn.,g 
persons against searches and seizures proscribed by the Fourth 
Amendment. I believe that a resolution of the issue raised by this 
case is possible with due recognition of both of these issues, and ~tl 
manner compatible with the prior decisions of this Court. 
lfp/ss lee Rider A, p. 15 (Almeida) 6/6/73 
Although standards for probable cause in the context of this 
case are relatively unstructured (cf. United states v. trnited States 
:Qi~.!_rict Court1 ~~..~!.!".!, at 322), there are a number of relevant 
factors which would merit consideration: without attempting a 
definitive or all inclusive statement, they include ( i) the frequency 
with which aliens illegally in the country are known or reasonably \ 
believed to be transported within a particular area; ( 11) the proximity 
of the area in question to the border; (iii) the extensiveness and 
geographic characteristics of the area, including the roads therein 
and the extent of their use; and (iv) the probable degree of interference 
with the rights of innocent persons, taking into account the scope , 
I 
I 
of the proposed search, its duration, and the demographic 
characteristics of the area. • 
*Depending upon the circumstances, there may be probable cause , 
for the search to be authorized only for a designated portion of a 
particular road or such cause may exist for a designated area which 
may contain one or more roads or tracks. It is to be bome in mind, 
particularly along much of the Mexican border, that there are vast 
areas of uninhabited desert and arid land which are traversed by 
few, if any, main roads or highways, but which nevertheless may 
afford opportunities ... by virtue of their isolated character for the 
smuggling of a t:llli.!iC;u aliens. 
I 
2. 
Jn short, the determination of whether a warrant should be 
issued for an area search involves a balancing of the legitimate 
interests of law enforcement with the Fourth Amendment rights of 
i!DIDfK innocent persons. This presents the type of dellcate question 
of constitutional judgment which ought to be resolved by the Judieiary 
rather than the Executive. Jn the words of Camara, 
"this is precisely the discretion to invade private 
property which we have consistently circumscribed 
by a requirement that a disinterested party warrant 
the need to search. " 387 u.S. at 532-533. 
Nor does the novelty of the problem posed by roving searches 
in border areas undermine the importance of a prior judicial deter ... 
mination. When faced with a similarly unconventional problem last 
term in Unite_~_~ates District Court, supra, we recognized that the 
focus of the search there involved was ''less precise than that 
direeted against more conventional types of crime," and that 
~ "[d]ifferent standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment 
if they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of 
government . . . and the protected rights of our citizens. " 407 
,' 
3. 
U.s. at 322-323. Yet we refused to abandon the Fourth Amendment 
commitment to the use of search warrants whenever this is feasible 
with due regard to the interests affected. For the reasons stated 
above, I think a rational search warrant procedure is feasible in 
cases of this kind. As no warrant was obtained here, I agree that 
the judgment must be reversed. I express no opinion as to whether 
there was probable cause to issue a warrant on the facts of this 
particular case. 
' ., 
Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S. 
Dear Potter and Byron: 
At long last, I have produced a draft which reflects my 
thinking and conclusion on the above case. 
Although I will not be able to circulate this until Monday~ 
and may have some further changes, I thought it was best to 
get it to the two of you immediately. I regret having held you 
up, and in the case of Byron to be in the unwelcome position 
of depriving him of a Court. 
My draft is written, as you will see, on the assumption 
that the case will now be reversed. In short, I agree with the 
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June 11, 1973 
No. 71-6278 Almeida-Banchez v. U. S. 
Here is a concurring opinion. · 
As I would reverse the judgment, I have assumed that Potter's 
opinion would become the plurality opinion of the Court. 





.jltJlttlttt Q}ttttrl of tqt ~tb" .jta:l:tg 
-asfringt~ !Q. (!}. 20p}1~ f Jl ~-~ E C 0 p 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. June 11, 1973 
No. 71-6278 Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S. 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Here is a concurring opinion. 
PLEASE R£TIRN' 
TO FILE 
As I would reverse the judgment, I have assumed that Potter's 
opinion would become the plurality opinion of the Court. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
ss 
' -· 
~tq.rrl.'me <!fourt of t~t 'J:lnitc~ .;%;tatcs 
'Jlnaslyingtott. JD. <!}. 20pJ1~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WM . .J. BRENNAN, .JR. June 11, 1973 
RE: No. 71-6278 - Aln.eida-Sanchez v. 
United States 
Dear Potter : 
I an ... still with you, of course, on 
your opinion in the above. 
Sincerely, 
/~( 
lVu. Justice Stewart 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
,juvrttttt ~and llf tltt ~ttittb ~hdta 
'llaaft-htghtn, gl. OJ. 21l~J!.~ 
June 11, 1973 
MEMORANDUM TO: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
The enclosed is the kind of concurrence 
I had in mind in connection with joining Lewis 
Powell's approach in Almeida-Sanchez 
Copies to: Mr. Justice Douglas 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
Mr. J ustice Powell 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
.§nprl'1tt~ ~onrt of tltc ';tutitdl .§tatcs 
:uraglrmgtltn, p. Qi.. za£;>~;3 
June 11, 1973 
Re: No. 71-6278 - Almeida-Sanchez v. United States 
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring. 
The governing test in Fourth Amendment cases is 
that of reasonableness, Cady v. Dombrowski, post ____ • 
The judgment of Cong·ress, the lower courts, and those 
administering the immigration laws has uniformly been that 
because of tl::. ~ problems inherent in preventing illegal 
entries by aliens, neither warrant nor probable cause should 
be required in every case where a vehicle is searched for 
aliens either at the border or in areas near thereto. That 
judgment appears sufficiently reasonable to me to agree 
without reservation with Parts I and II of .the Court's opinion. 





the necessity for securing warrants to support stops and 
searches by roving border patrols. But I acquiesce in 
and join Part III of the Court's opinion. ·How much 
protection the warrant will afford in this context I am 
unsure. But it may prevent some abuses; and, as the Court 
points out, searches normally must be supported by warrant. 
At the same time, it does not appear to me that requiring 
the warrant contemplated by the Court's opinion will place 
insuperable obstacles in the way of performing what is 
already a difficult job or substantially reduce the authority 
of the roving patrol in sens itive areas near the border such 
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the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit. 
{ June -, HJ73] 
MR. Jus'l'ICE PowELL. concurring in the result . 
As my views of this case and resolution of the problem 
involved differ from those expressed in the opinio11 of 
the Court. 1 find it necessary to state these views in som<• 
detail. We are confrontPd here with the all too familiar 
necessity of reconcilin~ a lC'gitimate 11eed of government 
with constitutionally protccteu rights. Then· eall be 
no question as to the seriousness and legitimacy of the 
law enforcement problem with respect to enforcing along 
thousands of miles of open border valid immi~ratio11 and 
related laws. Nor can there be any question as to the 
necessity, in our free society, of safeguarding persons 
against searches and seizures proscribed by the Fourth 
Amendment. I believe that a resolution of the issue 
raised by this case is possible with due recognition of both 
of these interests. and in a manner compatible with thP 
prior decrsions of this Court.' 
I 
The search here involved was carriC'd out as part of a 
roving search of automobiles in an area generally proxi-
mate to the Mexican border. Lt was not a border search , 
nor can it fairly be said to have been a search COil-
1 I <llU in <lcconJ w1th thr Court 's eouclu~i01.1 thal nothing ill 
t, l i. S. C. ~ 1:357 (a) or 111 K CFB 287 .l ~rrvc~ to a11t horizP UJJ 
othrrwi,;p IIDrOn~tittJtiona[ HPal'Ch . 
·. 
71-fl27R-C'ONcrn 
2 ALMEIDA-SANCHEZ v. UNITED STATES 
ducted at tlw "functional equivalent" of the border. 
Nor docs this case involve the constitutional propriety 
of searches at permanent or temporary check points 
removed from thr bordrr or its functional equivalent. 
Nor, finally. was the 8earch based on caus<' in the ordi-
nary sense of specific knowledge concerning an auto-
mobile or its passengers." The question posed. rather, is 
whether and under '"hat circumstances the Border Patrol 
may lawfully conduct roving searches of automobiles in 
area 110t far removed from the border for the purpose 
of apprehending aliens illegally en tcring or in the country. 
The Government has made a convi11cing showing that 
large numbers of aliens cross our borders illegally at placrP-
other than estabLished crosf'ing point~ . that they an· oft<'ll 
assistt>d by slllugglcrs. that even thof't' who cross on foot 
arP nwt and transported to their destinations by auto-
mobiles . and that roving checks of automobiles are thr 
only feasible means of apprehending them. It would, 
of course, be wholly impracticable to maintain a COil-
stant patrol along thousands of miles of bordN. More-
over, because 1uany of thesr aliens cross the border on 
foot, or at places other than <~stablished checkpoints. it 
is simply not possibl<· in mo~t ca:::es for thP Government 
to obtain specific knowledge that a person riding or Att. .answer, reconcil.i.rls 
stowed in an automobile is an ailPn illegally in the coun- the obvious needs 
try. Thus thP lllagnitudC' of tlw problem is clear. ~--tOf law enforcement 
"Tlw Sollr1tor c;enrral ·~ hn<'f 111 thi~ l'ourt ~taH•:,; rxplic1tl~ · that 
' 'We ... do not tak<' the po;:ition that tbP rhr('king; oprration~ nrP 
ju:-;tifird brcau~r tlw ofric<'r~ havr prolmblt' Ci!\l~r or t>Vl'll 'ren~onable 
:-;u~picion ' to bt>IH'n ' , with rp,.;pt>rt to Paeb \'('hirlt• chrcked, tlwt 11 
contain~ an illegal i!IH'll. Ap:trt from tlw rra~onahlrii<'~" of r~tnbli~h­
mc·nt of thr clwrking op<'l'iltiOn 111 thi~ ra"<', then• ~~ notlnng in tlw 
rrcord to indicatC' that til(' Border Pntrol oflic<•r,.; had any :-; prciaJ or 
particular rrnHon to ~toppet1tionn and t·xamuH• hi~ car" Bnd for · 
thl' Pll11l'd S1n1e~ , pp . \-l- JO •. 
with relevant 
constitutional 
rights, is far less 
clear. 
'-t I 
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II 
The Government's argument to sustain the search here 
is simply th was rf'asonablc under the cir-
cumstances. But it is by now axiomatic that the Fourth 
'menclment's proscription of "unreasonable searches and 
seizures" is to be rf'ad in conjunction with its command 
that "no Warrants shall issue. but upon probable cause." 
Undf'r our cases. both the concept of probable cause and 
<\i the requirement of a warrant b<•ar on the reasonableness 
Before deciding o a search, though in certain limit0d circumstancE>s..;2.... 
whether a warrant 
is required, I will neither is requirf'~. The problem of ascertaining the 
first address the meaning of the pro able cause r0quirement in the con-
threshold quest ion text of roving sea chPs of th0 sort conducted lwre is 
of whether some fun asural;?ly assiste by thr Court's opinion in ('amam 
tional equivalent Muuicipal ('ourt, 387 C. S. 523 ( H)('\7 l . on which the 
of probable cause Gov<•rnnwnt rPlies heavily. ThP Court was thrrP con-
may exist for the cerned with thP naturr of thP probable cause rf'quire-
type of search ment in the context of searches to identify housing code 
conducted in this ~iolations and was persuaded that thr only workablE' 
case • nwthod of <'11 forcemen t was t><'riodic i n~rwction of all 
struct u I'<'S 
'It is h<'r<' that the probahl!' caul:'t' drbatP it- fo<'used . 
for the agency~- decision to conduct an arC'a ut-
spection is unavoidably based on its appraisal of 
condition in the an•a as a whole. not on its knowl-
edge of couditiotts in each particular building." 3R7 
P. S .. at .")3(-i 
Jn concluding that such general knowledge met tlw 
probable caus(' requir<'ment under those circumstances. 
th<• Court took note of a "long history of judicial and 
public acceptance," of the absence of other methods for 
vindicaLing tlw publie interest in prPvetlting or abating 
dangerous conditions. and of thf' limit<'d invasion of pri-
( vacy oecasion<'d by inspections which are " twitlwr per-
~,, t'f; li't I ·~ ff"QI i1 V ~ r-----7 
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is high, both in absolute terms and in proportion to the 
number of persons legally present. While these searches 
are not border searches in the conventional sense. they 
ar0 incidental to the protection of the border and draw 
a large measure of justification from the Government 's 
extraordinary responsibilities and powers with respect to 
the border. Finally, and significantly, these are searches 
of automobiles rather than searches of persons or build-
ings. The search of an automobile is far less intrusive 
on the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment than 
the search of one's person or of a building. This Court 
"has long distinguished between an automobile and a 
home or office.·· Chambers v. Maroney , 3~)0 U.S. 42. 48 
(Hl70). As the Government has demonstrated, and as 
those i11 the affected areas surely know, it is the auto-
mobile which in most cases makes eff('ctive the att('mpts 
to smuggle aliens into this country. 
The conjunction of these factors- consistent .i uc..licial 
approval. absence of a reasonable alternative for the 
solution of a serious problem, anrl only a modest intruswn 
on those whosE' automobilc8 arP searched- persuades 
Ill<' that under appropriate' limiting eircumstances ther0 
cTay exist~constitutionally adequat~probablE' cause to 
9. \~'Conduct roving vehicular searches in border areaS. 
1fT 
The conclusion that there may be probable cause to 
conduct roving SE'arches doE's not PIHI the inquiry , for 
"except in eertain can•fully clefinrd classE's of cases. a 
search of privatE' property without propf'r consE'nt is 
'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid 
search warrant.·· Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, 
387 C. S .. at 528. 52}). I expressed the vif'w last Term 
that the warrant clause reflects an important policy df'-
termination : "Thf' Fourtl: Anwndnwnt does not con-
templatE' the executive officers of Governme11t as neutral 
•, 
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and disinterested magistrates. Their duty and responsi~ 
bility is to enforce the laws, to in V('stigatc and to prose~ 
cute . . . . But those charged with this investigative 
and prosccutorial duty should not be the sole j udgcs of 
when to utilizc constitutionally sensitive means in pursu-
ing their tasks." United Stales v. Un ·ited States District 
Court, 407 P. S. 207.317 (1072). Sec also'"Coolidge v. L 
Nev..' Hampsh1:re, 403 t'. S. 443. 401 (1071); Chimel v. 
California, 395 F. S. 752. 763-764 ( 1060) . 
To justify warrantless searches in circumstanes like 
those presented in this case. the Governnwnt relies upon 
several of this Court's decisions recognizing exceptions 
to the warrant requirement. .-\ hriPf rt'\'i<'w of tlw nature 
of cach of thPSl' major exceptioiiS ill111ninates tlw rcle>-
vant considrrations in the present cas<'. ln Terry v. Ohio, 
392 F. S. 1 (1D68). thP Court hclcl that a policeman may 
conduct a limited "pat down" search for wpapons when 
he has reasonable grounds for bPliPving that criminal 
conduct has taken or is taking place and that the ]><•rson 
he SParchcs is armed and dang<•rous. ' 'The :::olP JU~tifi ­
cation l for such a I search . . is tlH• protPction of tlw 
poliee officer and others ll('arby . . :·m2 l T. ~ • • at :.W 
l\'othing in Terry supports a11 exception to the• warrant 
requirement here. 
Colonnade Calerinr; Corp. V . United States, :397 e. ~. 
7'2 (1970). and United Stales v. Biswell, 406 U. ~- 311 
(1972), on which the Government also relies. both con-
ccnH'U the standards which ~overn inspcetions of the 
businef's premises of those with federal licenses to <'ll~age 
.in the sale of liquo1', Colonnade, or tlw salP of guns, 
Bisu•ell. ln those eases. Congress was held to havP powN 
to authorize \Varrantless searches. As the Court stated 
ill B is well · 
"When a deaiPr chooses to engage in this J)('rvasivcly 
regulated busi1wss and to accept a federal license, 
.. 
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he cloPs so with the knowledge that his business 
records, firearms, and ammunition will be subject 
to pffectiw inspection ." 406 C. ~-. at 316 . 
Colou11ad£' and Hiswell cannot fairly [)(' read to covc>r 
cases of present typr. Onr who merely travrls in regions 
near the bordrrs of the country can hardly be thought to 
haw submitted to inspections in rxchange for a special 
perquisite. 
Morr closely in point on their facts are the cases ill-
volving automobile searches. E. fl., Carroll v. United 
Btates, 2(17 l'. f-i. 132 ( 1925 l; Chambers v. Maroney, 
supra: Coolidge v. X e·w Hampshire, supra. But whik 
those cases allow auto1nobilrs to br srarched without a 
warrant in certain circumstaiJC'<'S. tlw princ1pal rationale 
for this exceptio11 tu tlw warrant clauf'r is tha1 under 
those circmnl"tances "it is not practicable to secure a 
warrant because the vehicle can bl' quickly mowd out 
of thr locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must 
be sought." Carroll , .. Pniled States, supra, 267 C. ~ .. 
at 15:3. The Court today correctly points out that a 
warrantl<'SH S<'arch tJnciPr tlH' Carroll line of caPP~ must 
he Pupport<'d by probabl<' cau~>r i11 tlH' S<'nse of SJll'Cifie 
knowledge about a particular au tomohile. Whlll', as J 11-
dicated above, my vit>w is that on appropriate facts the 
Government can satisfy the probable cause requirement 
for a roving S<'arch in a bordPr arra \vi thou t possessing, 
information about particular automobiles, it does not 
follow that the warrant rPquirrmrnt is inapposit<'. Th<' 
very fact that the (;owrnn)('nt's supporting informati<)IJ 
rf'latrs to criminal activity in certain areas rathPr thau 
to rvidence about a particular automobilP rPnders ir-
relPvan t the j ustifieation for warrantless searches relied 
upo11 in C'arroll and its prog<'ny. Quite simply the roving 
RParches arP .i ustified by <'xperirnce with obviously nOll -
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None of thr foregoing exceptions to thr warrant re-
quirenwnt, then, applies to roving automobile searches 
in border areas. Moreovrr. the propriety of thr war-
rant procedure here is affirmatively established by 
Camara. ~e(' also See \'. City of 8eattle, 387 LT. ~. 541 
( H)67). For the reasons outlined above. the Court there 
rulrd that probable cau~e could be shown for an area 
search, but nonetheless required that a warrant be ob-
tained for unconsented scarchrs. The Court indicated 
its general approach to excPptions to thr warrant 
rrqu irement : 
" In assessing whether thr public interest demands 
creation of a general exce ption to the warrant re-
quirement, the question If; not wlwth<'T· the pubhc 
interest justifies the type of search in questwn. but 
wlwther the authority to se>arch should be evic!Pnced 
by a warrant, ;vhich in turn depends in part upon 
whetlwr the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely 
to frustrate the govertJillelltal purpo:::c behmd thl' 
sParch .'' :-3g7 LT. ;.\ ., at 5:3:1. 
St>e also l'mLed :Stales\' . ('ulled 8Lates !Jistnct Court, 
supm, 407 r . S., at :315. 
The Government arp:uPs that ('a mara anJ See arr clls-
tinguishable from the pn'sent case for the purposes of 
thr \\'arrant r<'QUirement. lt is true that while a builcl-
mg illSJWCtor who is rpfused adnusswn to a buillllng may 
C'asily obtain n warrant to seareh that building. a mcnl-
ber of the Border Patrol has no such opportunity when 
he is refused pcrnussion to inspect an automobile. lt is 
also true that the judieial function envisioned in Camara d,'cJ ,., 0 t Qx-Je,., d 
~JiWo~~loll+I'WM't~~w.~"""""~!W.J.i~U~~a.IOQ~~~-l -fo r ~ "Yt ~,e) r Cl ..;, 'u 11 
tJ,61u ~ "the basic agency decision to canvass any arC'a.'' 
387 l'. ~ .. at 5:32. while' the judicial function here woulrl 
peceRsarily include passing on JU~L w<·h a basic dec:isio11 
o-f 
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But it does not follow from these distinctions that "no 
warrant system can be constructed that would be feasible 
and meaningful." Brief for the United States, at 36. 
Nothing in the papers before us demonstrates that it 
would not be feasible for the Bordrr Patrol to obtain 
advance' judicial approval of th<' decision to conduct 
roving S<'arches on a particular road or roads for a rea-
sonable penod of time. " Aecordi11g to the Gowrnment, 
the incidenct' of illegal transportation of aliens on cer-
tain roads is predictable. and the roving searches are 
apparently planned in advance or carried out according 
to a predetf'rmined schedule. The use of au area war-
rant procedun' would surC' Iy not "frustrate the govPrn-
mental purpose bC'hind tlH' seareh . ('amara \·. Jiu-
nicipal Court, supra , ;37~ C ~ .. at .1~:3. It \\·ould of 
course en tai I somt' iucon venH'IH'P. but 1ncon venH'IlC< · 
alone has nC'ver been thought to bt' an adequate reason 
for abrogating the warraut reqmreHl('llt. 8. ()., l 'mted 
States \' . ('nited States District ('ourl, supra, 407 C . :-,. , 
at 321. 
Although standards fur probablt' cause iu the context 
of th1s case are rclatJvC'ly unstructured (cf. Cmted &ates 
v. l ' nited States District Court, supra,407 C.~ .. at :32:2). 
there arC' a number of relevant factors which would nwnt 
COilSideration: they include ( i) the frequency with whiCFi 
aliens illegally in the country arc k110Wn or reasonably 
beliPvPd to be transported with i 11 a particular arC' a; 
( i1) the proxuni ty of the area in question to the bordPr ; 
(iii) the extensivenf'ss and geographic characteristics of 
the arPa, including the roads thrrPin and the C'xtent of 
TlwrP 1~ no r('a~on wh~· a .JU(Iiclal oliie<'f' could not <1 pJH'O\'(' whPrP 
appropn<~t<• a ~<'1'1<'~ of rovlllg ~<'nrrlws ovpr thr rours(' of s<'v('ral 
da~·" or W('C'b. ExpPnC'JH'<' w1th nntnillnl "Parch or "('riP~ of ~PHrclw~ 
would lw htghl~ rPIPvant in <'Oilsid<'rillg appltcntwns for rt'JI('WHI of 
' I WHI'r<!lll , 
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their use~he probable degree of interference 
\\·ith the rights of inn persons, taking into account 
the ecoJW of the proposed sea its duration, and the 
f-h"<~.~c~a-)~e- @l+a:f'~(*l"+s.i;~~ t;fi. ~1'('-a·rt" 
In ~hurt. the drtt'rtni11ation of wlwtlwr a warrant 
should be issurd for an area search .involvrs a balancing 
of thr legitimatP .interef:ts of law enforcement with pro-
tected Fourth Amendment rights. This preseu ts the type 
of delicate question of constitutional judgment which 
ought to be resolved by the Judiciary rather tha11 the 
Executive . Ill the words of Camara , 
"This iH precisely tlw discretion to 1 n vade private 
property vvhich we have consistently circumscribed 
by a requirc•ment that a disinterrsted party warra11t 
tlw nec·d to search " :~~7 C . S., at .);~:2-;);3;~. 
~or does tlw IIOWlty of the problem posed by rovuJK 
SC'arcJws in bordc•r areas undermine the importatteP of a 
prior judicial detc•rminatiotl. \Vlwn faepd with a silll-
ilarly unconventiOnal problc•m last Tem1 i11 ( 'niied Stales 
/Jistrict Court, supra , \VC rc•cogni zed that the focu s of the 
sParch thcr0 involved \o\ai:' " less precii:'P than that dir<"ctPd 
aga1nst mort• conventional typt>::; of <'t'llllt' .'' awl that 
"I djitfereJJt standards tnay b<• c·ompatibk• w1th th · 
Fourth AnH'tHlment if tlwy an• rca~::onable both in rrla-
tion to the legitimatP need of government ... and the 
protected rill."hts of our citJzens." 407 l '. S., at :322- :323. 
Yet we refusC'd to abandon th<' Fourth Amcndnwnt com-
' l>rpt'tHltllg upon tlw c·tn·um~tatH' <'~, th<·n· nw~· IH· probable· c·nttH ' 
for tht• ~rar('h to IH' authon%rd on!~ · for a dt':'tgnat('(l portton of ;t 
pttritt·Jtlar road 01 :'lt<"h <'illl"t' ma~· t'XJ"t lor a dt':'tgnatrd arPa wln<"h 
ma.1· contatn <HIP or mort· road~ or t rark" . l'n rt icularly along much 
ol tiH• :\lt•xtt'illl bordt•r, 1 ht•rt• ill'<' \'iit'l an'<J" of uninh<Jbitc•d dP;;nt 
nnd and lnnd \\'lllch <JrP lnt\'t•r,;pd by fP\1' , If' nn~· . main rond,; or 
htghw;t~ "· but whtch tH'\'t'rt IH'It•"" ma.\· a fl'ord opport unit t(',.;- b.' 
l'l t' t \1(' Of I hrn· J ~olatPd rhal'(J('I t•r- for t hr• ,.;mlJgp:l\llg of <tiirll~ 
concentration of 
illegal alien 
traffic in relation 
to the general 
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mitment to the use of search warrants whenever this is 
feasible with due regard to the interests affected. 
For the reasons stated above, I think a rational search 
warrant procedure is feasible in cases of this kind. As 
no warrant 'vas obtained here, I agree that the judgment 
must be reversed. I express no opinion as to whether 
there was probable cause to issue a warrant on the facts 
of this particular case. 
ist DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
:No. 71-6278 
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of Appeals for the Ninth 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL. concurnug 111 the result. 
As my views of this case and resolution of the problem 
involved differ from those expressed 111 the opinion of 
the Court, I find it nec<.>ssary to stat<.> thet>e v1ews in some 
detail We are confronted here with the all too familiar 
necessity of reconciling a legitimate need of government 
with constitutionally protected rights. There can bf' 
no question as to the seriousness and legitimacy of thf' 
law enforcement problem with respect to enforcing along 
thousands of miles of open borclf'l' valirl immigration and 
related laws ~or can there be any question as to tlw 
necessity, 1n our frc>e ~oc1ety. of safeguarding perso11s 
agamst t>earchc>s and se1wres proscrib<'d by th<' Fourth 
Amendment l behevp that a resolutiOn of tlw tSSU<' 
raised by this case is possible with due recognitiOn of both 
of thesf' intf'rests. and in a mann<'r ~ornpatiblP with the 
pnor df'f'iswns of th1s ('nurt ,' 
The search here u1volved was carrwd out as part of a 
roving search of automobiles in an area generally proxi. 
mate to the Mexican border [ t was not a border search . 
nor can it fairly lw said to have been a search con -
1 I am 111 aeeord With tlH' l'ou rt ~ conelu~IOIJ t ha 1 not hill!!, i 11 
!.. l l 8 C § 1:357 (a) or 111 I' <'FH :21-:7 I sPrVPs 1o aut honw ''" 
ot hrrwi~f' 11 nco11stnut JOI1al sm rrk 
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ducted at the ' 'functional eqmva1ent" of the border. 
Nor does thts case involve the constitutiOnal propriety 
of searches at permanent or temporary check points 
removed from the border or its functional equivalent. 
Nor, finally. was the search based on cause 111 the ordi-
nary sense of specific knowledge concerning an auto-
mobile or its passengers." The questiOn posed, rather. Is 
whether and under what circumstances the Border Patrol 
may lawfully conduct roving searches of automobiles lli 
areas not far removed from the border for the purpose 
of apprehending aliens illegally entering or in the country. 
The Government has made a convincing showing that 
large numbers of aliens cross our borders illegally at places 
other than established crossmg points, that they are often 
assisted by smugglers. that even those who cross on foot 
are met and transported to their destwations by auto-
mobiles, and that roving checks of automobiles are the 
only feasible means of apprehending them. [t would , 
of course, be wholly tmpracticable to mamtain a con-
stant patrol along thousands of miles of border. More~ 
over, because many of these aliens cross the border on 
foot, or at places other than established checkpoints, It 
is simply not possible in most cases for the Government 
to obtain specific knowledge that a person riding or 
stowed in an automobile is an ailen illegally in the coun-
try . Thus the magnitude of th<> prohlem is clear An 
"Tlw Sohr1tor Gl'nrml 'H l.lnd 111 thJH Court ~tatl'H l'Xpl1c1tly that 
"We ... do not takP the po~1t1on that the rlwckmg opernt1ons ar~ 
.JUStified beca u::;e t he• uJJicrr~ have proba blr ca u~l' or even 'reasonable 
8UspicJOn · to believe, wttb re~pt•ct to each velllCll' clwcked, that 1t 
containH an Illegal :thPn Apart from the reasonablene~::; of e::;tablish-
ment of the checking oprrat JOn 1n thus catie, there• ~~ nothing m the 
rrcord to indicnte that thr Border Patrol oflicrr~ had any special 01 
particular rra~on to ~top prt1t10nrr and rxamme hi" rar." Brief for· 
th<· UmtPd Stat<'~ . pp 9-10, 
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answer. reconciling the obvious needs of law enforcement 
with relevant constitutional rights. is far less clear. 
r 1 
The Government 's argument to sustain the search herr 
is simply that it was reasonable under the Circum-
stances. But 1t ts by now axiomatic that the Fourth 
Amendment's proscription of "unreasonable searches and 
seizures" is to be read in conjunctio11 with its command 
that "uo Warrants shall issue. but upon probable cause." 
Under our cases, both the concept of probable cause a1H.l 
the requirement of a warrant bear on the reasonable1wss 
of a search. though in errtam lim1t0d f'Jre11mstancP~ 
neither i.ii required 
Before deciding whether a warrant IS rPqmred, l will 
first address the threshold question of whether some fune-
tional equivalent of probable cause may exist fur the type 
of search conducted m this case. The problem of ascer-
taining the meaning of the probable cause requirement 
in the context of roving searches of the sort conducted 
here is measurably assisted by the Court 's op11uou 111 
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 l'. ~- 523 ( HH:i7). 011 
which tht~ Government rehcs heavily . Th(• Court wa::-
there concerned with the nature• of the probable eaus(· 
requirement i.n the context of searches to identify housing 
code violatwus and was persuaded that, thC' ouly workable 
method of en forcernrn t was JWnochc 1nspectwl1 of all 
structures ' 
"lt, IS here that thC' probable cause debate 1s focused. 
for the agency 's decision to COJ1duct an area In -
spection ts unavoidably based un its appraisal uf 
conditions iu the area as a whol(', not on tts knowl-
edge of conditions 111 eaeh part1cular huildinp. ... :i~7 
~ ,.. ~ , l:l T i):ih 
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In concluding that such general knowledge met tlw 
probable cause req uirrmcnt under those circumstances. 
thP Court took not<' of a "lon12: his tory of JUdicial and 
public aeePptaJH'<'.·· of tlw abi"C'IIC'<' of othn Jnet hod~' for 
vindicating the public in tereHt w pn•vc•n ti11g or abating 
dangerous conditions, ami of tlw limited l!lvaswn of pn-
vacy occaswucd by aclminifltratiw J11S]WCtions which a)'(· 
"neithrr pcrsoual 111 natun· nor aimrd at discovery of 
evidence of crime." !d., at 5a7 
Roving automobile srarclwf' in bordPr rrgwns for alic·n~·. 
fikewise, have been consisten Lly approved by the• .1 udJ-
ciary. While the question is OJH' of first unprrssion Ill 
this Court. such s<'arches UJliformly have bP<'n sustain<•d 
by the courts of appeals whose JUI"Isc!IctJoJJ~ Include tllol"'t' 
areas of the border lwtween l\llexJco and tlw l'nited ~tat<'~-> 
where the problem has been mo~t :::c•vere. ~ee. e. y., 
United States v. Miranda, 42() F. 2d 28:-3 (CA9 Hl70); 
Roa-Rodriguez v. (luited SLates, 410 F. 2d 1206 (l'AlO 
1969). Moreover. as noted above. no alternativr solu-· 
tion is reasonably possible 
Tlw Governmrnt further arg,nc·~ that l"llch searciH•:, 
resemble thosP concluct<'rl in ( 'a111ara 111 tltat thc·.v an· 
undertakeu pnmarily for adilllnif'trat JV<' rathc'r tha11 
prosecutorial purposes . that their futJrtiOJl i~ simply to 
locate those who are illegally lwr<' and to deport them. 
Brief for the Pnited ~tate's. p. 28 11. :25. This argumpnt 
is supported by the assertion that only :3<;;, of alit'ns 
apprehended Ill this country an· prosc•euted. \Vhil<' tlw 
low rate of prosecution offers no l!:reat solacr to the 
innocent \Vhos<' automobile::: arc' searched or to tlw fpw 
who arc prosecuted. 1t does Perw to differentiate th1s 
class of searches from random arc'a sParches which arc' 110 
more than "fishing expeditions" for evidence to support 
prosecutions. The possibility of prospcution doPs not 
distinguish such sC'archrf' from those' involwd in Camara. 
Despite the Court's assertwn 1n that cas<' that tlw sParclws 
' . 
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were not "aimed at the discovery of crime,'' 387 U. 8., 
at 537, violators of the housing code there were subJect 
to criminal penalties. !d., at 523 n. '2. 
Of perhaps greater weight is the fact that these 
searches, according to the Governmeut, arc conducted i11 
areas where the concentration of illegally-present aliens 
is high, both in absolute terms and in proportion to tlw 
number of persons legally present. While these searchPs 
are not border searches in the conventional sense, they 
are incidental to the protection of the border and draw 
a large measure of justification from the Governmeut 's 
extraordinary responsibilities and powers with respect to 
the border. Finally, and significantly, these are searches 
of automobiles rather than searches of persons or build-
ings. The search of an automobile is far less intrusive 
on the rights protected by the Fourth Amendmellt than 
the search of one's person or of a building. This Court 
"has long distinguished between att automobile and a 
home or office" Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48 
(1970). As the Governmeut has demonstrated, and as 
those in the affected areas surely know, it ts the au to-
mobile which in most cases makes effectiw thP attemptf' 
to smuggle aliens into this couutry 
The conjunction of these factors-cous1stent .1 udiCial 
approval, absence of a reasonable alternative for the 
solutiou of a serious problem, and only a modest intrusion 
on those whose automobiles are searched-persuades 
me that under appropriate limiting Circumstances there 
may exist a constitutionally adequate equivalent of prob-
able causP to r.onduct. roving vehir.ular searches in bordPr 
areas. 
If I 
The conclusiOn that there may be probable cause w 
conduct roving searches does not end the inquiry, for 
"pxcept in certain carefully rlefined classes of cases , 8 .. 
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search of private property without proper consent is 
'unreasonable' unless it has beeu authorized by a valid 
search warrant. " Camara v. Municipal Court. s·upra, 
387 U. S., at 528, 529. I expressed the v1ew last Term 
that the warrant clause reflects an important policy d<:' ~ 
termination : "The Fourth Amendment does not con · 
template the executive officers of GovPrnme11t as neutral 
and disinterested magistrates. The1r duty and responsi-
bility is to enforce the laws, to Investigate and to pros<'~ 
cute .. , . But those charged with this invest1gatiw 
and prosecutorial duty should uot be the sole .1 udges of 
when to utilize constitutionally sensitive nieanR iu pursu -
ing their tasks... United States v. United States Distncl 
Court, 407 l l. ~ . 297, 317 ( 1972) . See also ('ool1:dye v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U. ~. 443. 491 ( 1971) ; ('himel v 
California, 395 U.S. 752,763- 764 (1969) . 
To justify warrantless searches in circumstanes like 
those presented 111 this case, the Government relies upon 
several of this Court's decisions recognizing exception!:' 
to the warrant requirement. A brief review of the natur(' 
of each of these major exceptions illuminates th e reh·-
vant considerations in the present casP. ln Terry v Ohio , 
392 U. S. 1 ( 1968), the Court held that a policemail may 
conduct a limited "pat dow11" search for weapons when 
be has reasonable grounds for believing that criminal 
conduct has taken or is taking place and that the person 
be searches is armed and dangerous. "The sole j ustifi-
cation [for such a] search ... IS th(' protection of the 
police officer and others nearby 392 U S .. at 29 
Nothing in Terry supports an exception to the warrailt 
requirement hen· 
Colonnade Cate1"/,ng ('orp . v. (!mted States, 397 U. ~ 
72 (1970), and nm:tAd 8tates v Biswell, 406 F . S. all 
( 1972), on which the Government also relies, both coll-
r.erned the standards which govern inspections of tlw, 
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business prcmis('S of those with federal licenses to engage 
in the sale of liquor. Colonnade, or tlw sale of gun . 
Biswell. In those rases. ('<mgn'E'S was held to have power 
to authorize warrantless SParclws. As the Court stated 
in Hiswell 
''When a dealer chooses to engage 111 this pervasiv<'ly 
regulated busmess and to accept a fl'd('ral license, 
he docs so with the knowledge that his business 
records, firearms. and ammunitiou will be subject 
to effective inspection." 40o t '. S .. at ;)Hi 
Colonnade and Bisu•ell cannot fairly bP read to eover' 
cases of present type. On<' \Vbo merely travels in regions 
near the borders of the country can hardly be thought W 
have submitted to inspections in Pxchange for a special 
perquisite . 
More closely 111 point on their facts an' the cases lll-
volving automobile searches. E. o. , Carroll "· Uuited 
States, 267 U. S. 132 ( 1925) ; Chambers \' Maroney. 
supra; Coolidge v. Xett' Hampshire , suprn. But whil< ' 
those cases allow automobiles to b(' searched without a 
warrant in ccrtam circumstancPs. the pri 11ci pal rational!> 
for this exception to the warrant claus<' is that undPr 
those circumstances "it IS not practicable to secure a 
warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out 
of the locality or jurisdiction in which th<> warrant must 
be sought." Carroll \' ( 'nited States, supra, 267 l '. :-) .. 
at 1.13 The Court today correctly points out that 11 
warrantle s search under tlw ( 'arroll line of cases must 
be supported by probable cause in tlw sense of specific 
knowledge about a particular automobile . While , as in 
dicated above, my view is that on appropriate facts the• 
Government can satisfy tlw probable cause requir<:'ment 
for a roving search in a border area without possessing 
information about particular automobiles, it does not 
follow that. t.h<> warrant requirement is inapposite. The• 
71-6278-CONCUR 
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very fact that the Government's supporting information 
relates to criminal activity in certain areas rather than 
to eviJencc about a particular automo!Jilc renders ir-
relevaJJt the justificatio11 for warrantless searches relied 
upon in Carroll and its progeny. Quite s_imply the roving 
searches arc justified hy experience with obviously non-
m.obilc sections of a particular road or area embracing 
several road::>. 
None of the foregoing exeeptions to the \\'arra11t re-
quirement, then. applies to rovi11g automobile searches 
in border areas. Moreover. the propriety of tlH:~ war-
rant procedure here is affirmatively Pstablished by 
Camara. See abo See v. Cit !J uf 8ealtle, :-3~7 C S. fi41 
(1967). For the reasolls outlined above. the Court there' 
ruled that probable cause could bL' shown for an area 
search, but nonetheless required that a warrant be ob-
tained for unconsented searches. The Court indicated' 
its general approach to exceptions to the warrant 
requirement : 
"In assessing whether the publie inten•st demands 
creation of a general <'Xceptio11 to tlw warraut n'-
quirement. the question is not ,,·hether the public· 
wterest justifies the typP of search 111 question. but 
whether the authority to search should be evidenced 
by a warrant. which in turn depends i11 part upon 
whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely 
to frustrate the governmental purposP behind tJw 
search." :)87 1J. ~-. at .13:-3. 
See also United States v_ [1 nited States !Jistn'ct Court, 
supra, 407 U. S., at 315. 
The Goverume11t argues that ('amara and See are dis-
tinguishable from the preseut casr for the purposes of 
the warrant requirernent. It is true that while a build-
ing inspector who is refused admission to a building may 
easily obtain a warrant to sea.reh that building, a mem-
" . 
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ber of the Border Patrol has no such opportunity when 
he is refused permission to inspect an automobile. It is 
also true that the .JUdicial function envisioned in Camara 
did not extend to reconsideration of "the basic agency 
decision to canvass any area," 387 U. S., at 53~. while 
the judicial function here would necessarily include pass-
ing on just such a basic deciswn . 
But it does not follow from these d1stwctwns that "no 
warrant system can be constructed that would be feasible 
and meaningful." Bnef for the U mted ~tatrs, at 30. 
Nothing in the papers before us demonstrates that 1t 
would not be feasible for the Border Patrol to obtain 
advance judicial approval of the demswn to couduct 
roving searches on a particular road or roads for a rea-
sonable period of t1me.' Accordmg to the Government, 
the incidence of illegal transportatwn of ahens on cer-
tain roads 1s predictable, and the rovwg searches are 
apparently planned in advance or carried out according 
to a predetermined schedule. The use of an area war-
rant procedure would surely not "frustrate the govern-
mental purpose behmd the search. Canw,ra v. Mu-
nicipal Court, supra, 378 U. :::l., at 533. lt would of 
course entail some mconvemence, but wcouvemence 
alone has never been thought to be an adequate reason 
for abrogating the warrant requirement. E. y., United 
States v ('nited States /Jt~t; nct Co·url, supra, 407 l :--- ., 
at 321. 
Although standards for probable cause in the co11text 
of this case are relatively unstructured ( cf. United State~> 
v. United States District Court, supra, 407 U.S., at 322), 
there are a number of relevant factors which would merit 
3 There i~ no reason wh~· a Juchcwl olficPr eould not u pprovt> where 
appropnate a ~ene~ of roving searcheo over the couroe of several 
days or wt>eb. ExpN1ence w1th au imtwl ~earch or seiw~ of search!'~ 
would be highly fE']PVflllt Ill COll::ilciE'nllg apphcatl011t-i for renewal of 
l\ w;trr0ni . 
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consideration : they mclude ( i) the frequency with which 
aliens illegally w the country are known or reasonably 
believed to be transported within a particular area , 
( ii) the proximity of the area In question to the border ; 
(iii) the extensiveness and geographic characteristics of 
the area, including the roads therein and the extent of 
their use,' and (Iv) the probable degree of interference 
with the rights of innocent persons, taking into account 
the scope of the proposed search. its duration, and the 
concentration of illegal alien traffic in relation to the 
general traffic of the road or area 
In short, the rleterminatwn of whether a warrant 
should be issued for an area st~arch mvolves a balanciu~ 
of the legitimate mterests of law pnforcenwnt with pro-
tected Fourth Amendment nghts. This presents the typ<' 
of delicate questi011 of constitutional judgment whiCh 
ought to be resolved by the Judic1ary rather than the 
Executive . In the words of Cam,ara, 
"This 1s precisely the discretwn to w vade pn vatt' 
property which we hav<' eonsii'tently < ~ ireumseribed 
by a reqUirement that a chsm teres ted party warrant 
the need to search " :)R7 I ' ~ . at. 532- 533 
Nor does the novelty ot the problem posed by rovmg 
searches in border areas undermine the Importance of a 
prior judicial determination . When faced with a sim~ 
ilarly unconventwnal problem last Term 1n United States 
District Court, supra, we recognized that the focus of the 
search ther<' in vol v0d wal:' "less prf'rif'<' than that directed 
1 Dependmg upon tlw Clf(.' lllll~tant<'~, tiH'l'P may lw probabll' tauw 
for the ~earrh tu lw authorized o11iy for a Jt•srp;Hated portwn ut " 
particular road or o; uch rHu~t, may ex1~t for n de~rgnated area whrc!J 
rna)· contarn onr or more road~ or track~ Particularly along much 
oJ the 1\Jexrrml border, tlwrr are va::;t arra~ of unrnhab1ted drHPrt 
and flrtd land whtrh are travrr~<·d b)' few , tf an)·, ma rn road~ or 
highway~, but wbteh uevrrt lwk~~ may :dford opportunit r P~-Il\ 
virtt[ f:\ of tlt<' tr J~Oiii!f-•d rhnr;~rtPr- for thr ~m1tgglmg oi niH• t t~ 
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against more conventional types of crime," and that 
" [ dj iffere11t standards may be compatible with the 
Fourth Amendment if they are reasonable both in rela-
tion to the legitimate need of government . .. and the 
protected rights of our citizens." 407 C. 8., at 322- 323. 
Yet we rcfus<>d to abandon thP Fourth Amendment com-
mitment to the use of search warrants whenever this It< 
feasible with clue regard to the interests afft~ctecl . 
For the reasons stated abOV(', 1 think a rational search 
warrant procedure is feasible i11 cases of this kind. As 
no warrant was obtained here. I agree that the judgme11t 
must be reversed. I express no opimon as to whether 
there was probable cause to issue a. warrant on the facts 
of this particular cas(' , 
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MR. JusTICE POWELL, concurrillg in the result. 
As my views of this case and resolution of the problem 
involved differ from those expressed in the opinion of 
the Court. I find it necessary to state these views iu some 
detail. We are confronted here with the all too familiar 
necessity of reconciling a legitimate need of government 
with constitutionally protected rights. There can be 
no question as to the seriousness and legitimacy of the 
law enforcement problem with respect to enforcing along 
thousands of miles of open border valid immigration and 
related laws. Nor ean there be any question as to the 
necessity, in our free society, of safeguarding persons 
against searches and seizures proscribed by the Fourth 
Amendment I believe that a resolutiOn of the Issue 
raised by this casP is possible with due recognitiOn of both 
of these interests. and in a manner f!ompatiblP with the 
pnor deCJ:=uon~ of thJ~ Cnurt,' 
The search here involved was carried out as part of a 
roving search of automobiles in an area generally proxi-
mate to the Mexican border. It was not a border search , 
nor can it fairly be said to have been a. search con-
' I am 111 accurrl wt11J t lw Court~ eunclu~IOJJ 1 hat nothmg in 
!.. ll S C § 1:357 (H) or tn k CFR 2S7 I ~rr·vr~ to authoriZf\ mt 
othPrwisP 11 nron~tn 11t10nH I ,.,<~tr·rl-1 , 
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ducted at the ''functwnal eqmvalent '' of the border. 
Nor does this case mvolve the constitutiOnal propriety 
of searches at permanent or temporary check points 
removed from the border or Its functional equivalent. 
Nor, finally, was the search based 011 cause 111 the ordi-
nary sense of specific knowledge coucernlllg a11 auto-
mobile or Its passengers." ThP questwu posed, rather, Is 
whether and under what Circumstances the Border Patrol 
may lawfully conduct rovlllg sC'arches of automobiles irl 
areas not far removed from the border for the purpose 
of apprehending aliens illegally entering or m the country. 
The Government has made a convlllcing showing that 
large numbers of alie11s cross our borders Illegally at places 
other than established crossmg points, that they are often 
assisted by smugglers. that even those who cross on foot 
are met and transported to their destwations by auto-
mobiles, and that roving checks of automobiles are the 
only feasible means of apprehending them It would . 
of course, be wholly unpracticable to mamtain a con-
stant patrol along thousands of miles of border. More 
over, because' many of these aliens cross the border on 
foot, or at places other than established checkpoints, It 
is simply not possible 111 most cases for the Government 
to obtain specific knowledge that a person riding or 
stowed in an automobile is an ailen illegally in the coun-
try Thus thP magnitudP of th0 problem is cl0ar An 
2 Thf' Solmtor Cencrai 'H Lmet 111 1111~ Court HtatP~ PxphcitJy that 
'' Wf' . do not take the po~Ition that tlw clwckmg operatiOns ar~ 
JU~tifiecl becau~P the ufiirer:-; haw probable cause ur t•vpn 'reasonablf' 
suspicwn · to beheve, w1th re~pPct to each velnch· c!l(>cked, that 1t 
contain;; an !llrgal alwn Apart from tlw n·a~onablcnl'~~ of establish-
ment of the checking oprratJOn Ill tim< ca~r. therP ~~ nothmg 111 the 
record to ind1cate that thr Border Patrol officrr~ had any Hpecial or 
particular rca~on to ~top prtitiOnPr and Pxammr h1~ rar " Brief for 
the lln1tecl Stat<'~ . pp ~J- J(l , 
il - (i:z7S--l 'ON('l J H. 
answer, reconciling the obvious needs of law enforcement, 
with relevant constitutional rights. is far less clear 
fl 
The Government 's argument to sustalll the search herP 
is simply that 1t was reasonable under the (arcum 
stances. But 1t 1s by tww axiomatic that the Fourth 
Amendment's proscription of "uureasouable searches and 
seizures'' is to be read iu con.1 unctwn with its command 
that "uo Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause." 
Under our cases, both the concept of probable cause am! 
the requirement of a warrant bear on the reasonableness 
of a search, though tn rertam hmitPd r'IrcumstallC<'::< 
neither 1s reqmred 
Before deciding whether a warrant. JS n'quJred. I w1ll 
first address the threshold questiOn of whetht'r some func-
tional equivalent of probable caus<• may exist for tlw typP 
of search conducted m this case. The problem of ascer -
taining the meaning of the probable cause reqUirement. 
in the context of roving searches of the sort conducted 
here> 1s measurably assisted by the Court 's op1mou ttl 
Camara v . Municipal Court, 3H7 l ' ~ . 523 ( 1967), 011 
which the- U:overnment relies heavtly The l'ourt wa~­
there concerned With the natur<' of the probable caw·w 
requirement in the context of scarcht's to Identify housmg 
code violatwns and was P<'rsuad<~d that the ouly workable 
method of enforcemPllt wat' pPrJOdlC tnspectwn ot all 
structur('S 
' 'It. ts here that the probable cause debate 1s tocused . 
for the agency s decision tu conduct au area 111 
SJWCtiOu 1s unavoidably based on Its appra1sal of 
conditions Jil the area as a wholt', not on 1ts knowl-
t>dge of conditionR lll each part;JCular building · :1x1 
\ , .0 :-, ~J I .);{h 
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In concluding that such general knowledge met tht· 
probable cause requirement under those circumstances. 
the Court took note of a "long history of .1 udicial aud 
public aceeptancp," of the abi:'('tle<' of otlwr methods for 
vindicating the public mterest lll preventing or abating 
dangerous conditions, and of the limited lllvaswn of pri-
vacy occasioned by administratiw msprctions which ar<' 
"neither persoual 111 nature nor auned at discov(•ry of 
evidence of crime. " !d., at 537 
Roving automobile searches i11 border rcgwm; for aliens .. 
likewise, have been consistently approved by the JUlll-
ciary. While the question is one of first impression '" 
this Court. such searches uniformly have bef'n sustamed 
by the courts of appeals whot'e .JUnsdwtwns 1nclude thost · 
areas of thc> border bPtwren lVJ exwo and the U uiterl State" 
where the problem has been tllot"t st•vere. See, e. y ., 
United States v. Miranda , 42(1 F. 2d 283 ( CA9 1H70), 
Roa-Rodriguez v. ( lnited Stales, 410 F. 2d 1206 ( CAlO 
1969). Moreover, as noted abovf', no alternative solu-
tion is reasonably possiblf' 
The Government further argues that such searches 
resemble those conducted in Cauwra til that they are 
undertakeu primarily for adlllllllstrati ve rather tha11 
prosecutorial purposes, that their functton is simply to 
locate those who are illegally here and to deport them. 
Brief for the United States, p. 28 n. '25. This arguuwnt 
is supported by the assertion that only 3rc of alicus 
apprehended in this country are prosecuted. While thv 
low rate of prosecution offers no great solace to thP" 
innocent whose automobiles are searched or to the few 
who are prosecuted, 1t does serve to differentiate thlti 
class of searches from random an-'a searches whiCh arf' no 
more than "fishing expeditions " for evidence to support 
prosecutions. The possibility of prosecution docs not 
distinguish such Ecarches from those involved 111 Ca,mara. 
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were not "aimed at the discovery of crime," 387 U. 8., 
at 537, violators of the housing code there were sub.Ject 
to criminal penalties. /d., at 523 n. :2. 
Of perhaps greater weight is the fact that thes€' 
searches, accordiug to the Government, are conducted itt 
areas where thP concentration of 1llegally-preseut alie11s 
is high , both in absolute terms and in proportion to tilt> 
number of persons legally present. While these searchPs 
are not border searches iu the conventional sense, they 
are incidental to the protection of the border and draw 
a large measure of justification from the Government 's 
extraordinary responsibilities and powers with respect to 
the border. Finally, and significantly, these are searches 
of automobiles rather than searches of persons or build-
ings. The search of an automobile is far less intrusiw 
on the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment than 
the search of one's person or of a building. Th1s Court 
"has long distingmshed between au automobile and a 
home or office" Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 48 
( 1970) . As the Government has demonstrated, and as 
those in the affected areas surely know, it is the auto-· 
mobile which in most cases make8 effective the attempts 
to smuggle aliens into this country 
The conJunction of these factors-consistent JUdiCial 
approval, absence of a reasonable alternative for tht 
solution of a serious problem, and only a modest intrusion 
on those whost> automobiles are searched-persuades 
me that under appropriate limitmg circumstances there 
may exist a constitutionally adequate equivalent of prob-
able cause to conduct roving vehicular searches in border 
areas. 
Ill 
The concluswn that there may be probable cause t.o 
conduct roving searches does not end the inquiry , for 
''pxcept in certain carefully defined classes of cases ll .. 
. . 
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search of pnvate property w1thout proper consent ls 
'unreasonable' unless it has beeu authorized by a valid 
search warrant." Canwra v. Municipal Court , s·upra. 
387 U. 8., at 528, 529. I expressed the view last Term 
that the warrant clause reflects an Important policy de~ 
termination: "The Fourth Amendment does not con -
template the executive officers of Government as neutral 
and disinterested magistrates. Their duty and responsi-
bility is to enforce the laws. to tnvestigate and to prose~ 
cute . But those charged with this 1nvest1gativP 
and prosecutorial duty should not be the sole .Judges of 
when to utilize constitutionally sensitive means in pursu-
ing their tasks." United States v. United 8tates Distnct 
Court, 407 C. ::-; . 297. 317 ( 197:2). tl<'<' also ('oo{?:dye v 
New Hampshire, 403 U. 8. 443. 491 ( 1971 l: C'hi·rnel v . 
California, 395 U. 8. 752, 763-764 ( 196\-.l J 
To justify warrantless searches in circumstanes like 
those presented m this case. the Government relies upon 
several of this Court's decisions recognizing exceptions 
to the warrant requirement. A brief review of the natur<"' 
of each of these major exceptions illuminates the rel(•-
vant considerations in the preseut casP. I u Terry v Ohio. 
392 U . S. 1 (1968). the Court held that a policpma11 may 
conduct a limited "pat down" search for weapons when 
he has reasonable grounds for believing that criminal 
conduct has taken or is taking place and that the person 
he searches is armed and dangerous. "The sole j ustifi-
cation r for such a l search is the protection of the 
police officer and others nearby 392 U ~ .. at 29 . 
Nothing in Terry supports an exceptiOn to the warrant 
requirement herr" 
Colonnade Catering Corp . v Umted States, 397 U ::-; , 
72 (1970), and United 8taies v Biswell, 406 U. 8. 311 
( 1972), on which the Government also relies, both con-
cerned the standards which govern inspections of tbP. 
• •. II'• 
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business premiSes of those with federal licenses to engage 
in the sale of liquor, Colonnade, or the sale of guns, 
Biswell . ln those cases, c:;ongress was held to have power 
to authorize warrantless searches As thP Court staterl 
ill R·iswell , 
"When a dealer chooses to Pngage 111 this pervasively 
regulated business and to accept a federal license, 
he does so with the knowledge that his business 
records, firearms. and ammunition will be subject 
to effective inspection ." 40n l ' H .. at 3lfi 
Colonnade and Biswell cannot fairly be read to cover 
cases of present type . One who merely travels in regions 
near the borders of the country can harrlly be thought to 
have submitted t,o tttspections in exchange for a specud 
perquJsJtP 
More closely 111 pomt on their fact~ are the caset:> 111 
volving automobile searches. E . IJ ., Carroll v. United 
8tates, 267 U. S. 132 (1925); Chambers v Maroney , 
supra; Coolidge v New Hampshire, supra. But whil~~ 
those cases allow automobiles to be searched without a. 
warrant in certalll circumstances, the pnucipal rationale 
for this exception to the warrant clause is that undrr 
those circumstances "it ts not practicable to secure' a 
warrant because' the vehicle can be quickly moved out 
of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must. 
be sought.·· ('armll ,. ( ' nited 8tatPs, supra, 267 lJ ~ . 
at 1.13 The Court torlay correctly points out that li 
warrantless search under thP ('arroll line of cases must 
be supported by probable cause in the sense of specific 
knowledge about a part1cular automobile While, as ill -
dicated above , my view is that on appropriate facts the 
Government can satisfy the probable cause requirement 
for a roving search in a border area without possessin!! 
mformation about particular automobiles, it does not 
follow that the> warrant rf'quirPment i~ inapposite Tht> 
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very fact that the Govermneut's supporting information 
relates to crimillal activity in certain areas rather than 
to eviJence about a particular automobile renders ir-
relevant the justificatiou for warrantless searches relied 
upon in Carroll and its progeny. Quite simply the roving 
searches are justified by experience with obviously noll-
mobile sectious of a particular road or area embracing 
several roads. 
None of the foregoing exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement, then, applies to rovi11g automobile searches 
in boruer areas. Moreover. the propriety of the war-
rant procedure here is affirmatively established by 
Camara. See also See v. City of Sealtle, 387 U. S. 541 
( 1967). For the reas011s outlined above. the Court there 
ruled that probable cause could be show11 for an area 
search, but nonetheless required that a warrant be ob-
tained for unconsented searches. The Court indicated 
its general approach to exceptions to the warrant 
requirement : 
"In assessing whether the public interest demands 
creation of a general exception to the warrant re-
quirement, the question is not whether the public 
interest justifies the type of search 111 question. but 
whether the authority to search should be evidenced 
by a warrant, which in turn depends in part upon 
whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely 
to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the 
search." 387 U. S., at 533. 
See also United States v. United States District Court, 
supra, 407 U. S., at 315. 
The Government argues that Camara and See are dis-
tinguishable from the present case for the purposes of 
the warrant requirement. It is true that while a build-
ing inspector who is refused admissio11 to a building may 
easily obtain a warra11t to search that building, a mem-
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ber of the Border Patrol has no such opportunity when 
he is refused permissiOn to inspect an automobile. It ts 
also true that the JUdicial function P-nviswned in Camara 
did not extend to reconsideration of "the basic agellcy 
decision to canvass any area," 387 U. S., at 532, while 
the judicial function here would necessarily mclude pass-
ing on just such a basic deciswn 
But it does not follow from these dJstlllctwns that "no 
warrant system can be constructed that would be feasible 
and meaningful. " Bnef for the Umted ~tates, at 36. 
Nothing in the papers before us demonstrates that tt 
would not be feasible for the Border Patrol to obtain 
advance JUdicial approval of the demswn to conduct 
roving searches on a particular road or roads for a rea-
sonable penod of tune. ' Accordmg to the Govermne1 1 t, 
the incidence of Illegal transportatwn of ahens on cer-
tain roads 1s predictable, and thP rovmg searches are 
apparently planned m advance or earned out accordmg 
to a predetermmed schedule. The use of an area war 
rant procedure would surely not "frustrate the govern-
mental purpose behllld the search .· Canw,ra v. Mu 
mcipa.l Court, .supra, 378 U. ~ .. at 533. lt would ot 
course entml some lllconvemencP, but wconvemenct> 
alone has never been thought to be an adequate reason 
for abrogating the warrant requirement. E. y., United 
States v r 'nitPd 8tatt<.~ /)1,!;/,ru·t ( '<Yurt. 8'Upra, 407 l ~ ' 
at 321 
Although standards for probable cause in the context 
of this case are relatively unstructured ( cf. United State~> 
v United States Distnct Court, supra, 407 U. 8., at 322), 
there are a number of relevant factors which would ment 
" There ~~ no reasou why a .JLLChcmJ otfict•r could not approvE' wherP. 
appropnate a ~ene~ of rov1ng ~Pa rche~ over thC' course of severa 1 
days or weeb. Expenence wnh a11 imtwl ~earch or ::.;c>nes of ::.;earche~ 
would be h1ghly rrlrvant 1n coJl~ldenng application~ for renrwal o( 
<\ warr<~.ht , 
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consiueration: they lllcludc• ( i J the freqtH'IIcy \\'ith \vhich 
aliens illegally in tlw country are kno\\'n or reasonably 
believed to be transportPcl w1th in a part iru Jar area; 
( ii) the proximity of the ar<'a in qu0~tion to the bordl·r ; 
{iii) the extensi vcness and geographic characteristics of 
the area. iucl uding the roads therein and the extent of 
their use,' and ( 1v) the probabl<' dcgre(• of intrrferenc·<· 
with the rights uf innoc0nt persons. taking into account 
the scope of tlw propo:::ed sc~arch. its duration. and tlw 
concentration of illegal alil'll traffi<· in relation tu the 
general traffic of the road or an•n 
In short. tlw detPrmination of \\'hether a warrant 
should be issuPd for a11 area Sl'arch Involves a balancing 
of the JegitimatP mt<'n•sts uf Jaw enforCPllfl'llt \Yith pro-
tected Fourth Anwnclnwnt rights. Tlus presents the typ<' 
of delicate question of t•onstitutional .iudgnwnt wlueh 
ought to be resolved hy tlw .J udieiary ratlwr than tlw 
Executive. Jn tlw words of Cani(Lru. 
11This IS precise ly tlw discretion tu lllvade pnvat<' 
property ,,·hirh \W have eons1sten tly ('ircumsrribl·d 
by a requirement that a chsintcrested party \\'arraiJt 
the ne<~d to sParch ." :~~~ l' ~ .. at 5:.t!-533 
Nor does the novelty ot the pr(lb]em post~d by rovlllg 
searches in border area~ undcrmuw tlw tmportance of a 
prior judicial determinatiOIJ. Wlwn faced with a sim~ 
ilarly uncoiivc•ntwnal problem last Tcnn 111 f 'nited ::itatr:::-: 
District Court. supra, we rc·cogn iz('d that thl' focus uf tlw 
search th<:>r<• involved \\·a:-: "lpss prPcisC' tha11 that dirPcted 
'DrpC'ndmg 11pm1 tht· <·Jr<'lllll~tallt't'~, thvn• m:t~ · [)(' probablt· <·au~•· 
for thr :;ea rrh to ut• authori~!'d onl~· for a d<'~tgnated portwn u! " 
(l!Hticular road or "uch l ': lll ~ t· ma~ · t'Xl~t for a dv~JgnatC'd <V'<':I ll'htel• 
rna~· contain onr or morr road~ or traek~ Partirularly along much 
of tlw l\h•xtr:ill boni<-r, t ll<'rl' an· \'a~ t a ·rPa~ of 11nmhahJtl'd df'~t·rt 
lllld and land ll'lllrh :J]"(• lril\"t•r~t·d h~ · f<'ll'. If :111.\·, lll:llll road~ 01 
higlnnt_\ ·~. IJllt ll'htl'h 111'\"(•rt lwll •,-, ma~ :tllord opport I Ill it )(•,;- I" 
virtqo of tiH'H i'ol:llt•d ('h:lr:~f·t••r- I'm tilt' 'ilillggiJng "' niH·t•' 
/ i 
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against more conventional types of crime," and that 
"[djifferent standards may be compatible with the 
Fourth Amendment if they are reasonable both in rela-
tion to the legitimate need of government ... and the 
protected rights of our citizens." 407 U. S., at 322- 323. 
Yet we refused to abandon the Fourth Amendment com-
mitment to the use of search warrants vvhenever this is 
feasible with clue regard to the in trrrsts affected. 
For the reasons stated above, 1 think a rational search 
warrant procedure is feasible in cases of this kind. As 
no warrant was obtained here, I agree that the judgment 
must be reversed. I express no opinion as to whether 
there was probable causr to issue a warrant 011 the facts 
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MH. Jus'l'ICE PowELL, concurring in the result 
As my views of this ease and resolution of the problem 
involved differ from those expressed in the opinion of 
the Court , 1 find it n0cessary to state these views m somE> 
detail We are confronted her<:> with the all too familiar 
necessity of reconciling a legitimate need of government 
w1th constitutionally protected rights. Then' can be 
no qucstiou as to the seriousness and legitimacy of the 
law enforcemeut problem with respect to enforcing a~ , 
thousands of miles of open border valid immigratior
~laws. Nor can there be any question as to the 
llecessity , in our free society, of safeguarding persons 
against searches and seizures proscribed by the Fourth 
Amendment. l believf' that a resolution of the 1ssue 
raised by this case is possible with due recognition of both 
of these interests , and ill a mamwr compatible with the 
prior deCisions of this ('ourL ' 
I 
The search here involved was carri0d out as part of a 
roving search of automobiles in an area generally proxi-
mate to the Mexican border. 1t was not a border search , 
nor can it fairly be said to have been a search eon-
' l am rn accord wrth tlw Court'8 cunrlu8iou that nuthinp; itt 
>, l r S C. § 1:157 (a) or tn H CFR 2~7 1 ~Prvf'~ to a11t horizP au 
othrrwr.~p nnron~ritutJOnal ~<>an · h . 
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II 
The Government 's argument to sustain the search here 
.is simply that the search was reasonable under the cir-
cumstances. But it is by now axiomatic that the Fourth 
Amendment's proscription of "unreasonable searches and 
seizures'' is to be read in conjunction with its commaud 
that "no Warrants shall issue. but upon probable cause." 
Under our cases, both the concept of probable cause and 
the requirement of a warrant bear on the reasonableness 
of a search, though in certain limited circumstauces, 
neither is required . The problem of ascertaining the 
meaniug of the probable cause requirement in the con-
text of roving searches of the sort conducted here is 
measurably assisted oy the Court's opinion in eam.ara 
v. Mun1:cipal C'ourt , 3R7 11. S. 523 (1967) . on which the 
Government relies l1Pavily . The Court was then• con-
cerned with the nature of the probable cause require-
ment in the context of searches to identify housing code 
violations and was persuaded that the only workable 
method of enforcement was periodir inspection of all 
structures · 
" It, is here that the probable cause debate is focused . 
for the agency 's decision to conduct an area lll-
spection is unavoidably based on its appraisal of 
conditions in the area as a whole. not on its knowl-
edge of conditions in each particular building." 3R7 
l '. ~ .. at Fi3(-\ , 
In concluding that such general knowledge met the ... 
probablP causf• requirenwnt under those circumstances. 
the Court took note of a "long history of judicial anrl Jtnf'. l.:.~., 
public acceptance ," IJf the absenc<> of other methodR for J 
vindicating thP public interest in JWPventing or abating c2.G-<_,."f ... - . ' 
dangerous conditions, and of the limited invasion of pri-
vary oecasioned by inspPctions which are "nt>ither rwr-
7 J -f:i:27~-CONCllH 
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sonal in nature uor aimed at discovery of evidence of 
crime." Id., at 537. 
Roving automobi le searches in border regions for aliens, 
likewise, have been consistently approved by the judi-
ciary. While the question is one of first impression in 
this Court, such searches uniformly have been sustained 
by the courts of appeals whose jurisdictions include those .v.:;_ 
areas of the border between Mexico and the United States ~ 
where the problem has been most severe. :::lee, e. g., 
United States v. Miranda, 426 F. 2d 283 (CA9 1970); 
.( Roa-Rodriguez v. United States, 410 F. 2d 1206 (CAlO 
~~,;r II( II ~ 1969). Moreover, as noterl above, no altPrnativP solu-
~ • b f"- tion is reasonably possiblP J !;f!...,.,f'. 
fJI(~ -_ L-J. [ More troublesome is the problem of determming the ) J-,c..- ~ 
~---. Pxtent to which such searches invade the privacy of those ~ --::-?1 ,- ~ J s~.,:Je._,.,c.l!!- ' whose automobiles arP sear . . · · that only 3o/r J~ 1 -
~  awns appre 1en ec in this country are prosecuted. The "Sf' 4l J ~· 
Government therefore argues that such searches are con-~ -t....- · · .. 
ducted primarily for administrative rather than prose- bt f~ .-~L.~ ' 
cutorial purposes, that their function is simply to locate -Ht,J' .r.r-
those who are illegally here and to deport them. Brief c 
for the United States. p. 28 n. 25. While this conten-
tion offers no g;reat solace to the innocent whose auto-
mobiles are searched or to the fev,· who are prosecuted, 
it does serve to differentiate this class of searches from 
random area searches which arc no more than "fishing 
expeditions" for evidence to support prosecutions. ~ ft-;f -:J' 
does the possibility of prosecutiou distinguish such 
searches from the searches involved in Ca-rnara. DE-
spite the Court's assertion iu that case that the searches 
wpre not "aimed at the discovery of crime, " 387 U. ~-. 
at 537, violators of thP housing code there were subject 
to criminal penalties. I d .. at fi23 11. ::!. 
~ {j;) Of perhaps greater weight is the fact that these 
(.,V searches, according to the Government, are conducted in 
areafi wiH~re the concentration of illegally-present alien~S 
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is high, both in absolute terms and in proportion to the 
number of persons legally present.CVwhile these searches 
are not border searches in the conventional sense, they 
are incidental to the protection of the border and draw 
a large measure of justification from the Government's 
extraordinary responsibilities and powers with respect to 
the border. 'Finally, and significantly, these are searches 
of automobiles rather than searches of persons or build-
ings. The search of an automobile is far less intrusive 
on the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment than 
the search of one's person or of a building. This Court 
"has long distinguished between au automobile and a 
home or office." Chambers v. Maro·ney, 399 U.S. 42, 48 
( 1970). As the Government has demonstrated, and as 
those iu the affecteJ areas surely know, it is the au to-
mobile which in most cases makes effective the attempts 
to smuggle aliens into this country. 
The conjunction of these factors-consistent judicial_,...- p.J.. . .:C. 
approval, absence of a reasonable alternative for the 
solution of a serious problem, and only a modest intrusion -
on those whosE' automobilE's are searched- persuades 
me that under appropriat<' limiting circumstances then' 
may exist constitutionally adequate probable cause to 
conduct roving vehicular searches in border areas. 
Til 
The conclusion that there may be probable cause to 
conduct roving searches does not end the inquiry. for 
"except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a 
search of private property without proper consent is 
'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid 
search warrant .'' Camara v. Municipal Court, supra, 
387 U. S., at 528, 529. I expressed the view last Term 
that the warrant clause reflects an important policy de-
termination : "The Fourtt Amendment does not con-
template the executive officers of Government as neutral 
I 
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and disinterested magistrates. Their duty and responsi~ 
bility is to enforce the laws, to investigate and to prose~ 
cute . . . . But those charged with this investigative 
and prosecutorial duty should not be the sole judges of 
when to utilize constitutionally sensitive means in pursu-
ing their tasks." United States v. United Stales District 
Court, 407 U. S. 297, 317 (1972). See also, Coolidge v. 
Ne'w Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 491 (1071); Chimel v. 
California, 395 U. S. 752. 763-764 (1969). 
To justify warrantless searches in circumsta1fe, like 
those presented in this case, the Governnwnt relies upon 
several of this Court 's decisions recognizing exceptions 
to the warrant requirement. A brirf review of the nature 
of each of these major exceptions illuminates t lw rele-
vant considerations in the present cas<'. In Terry v. Ohio, 
392 F. S. 1 (1968), the Court held that a policeman may 
conduct a limited "pat down" search for weapons when 
he has reasonable grounds for believing that criminal 
conduct has taken or is taking place and that the ]Wrsou 
he searches is armed and dang<'fous. "The sole JUFtifi-
cation l for such a l search .. is the protection of tlH• 
police officer and othrrs nearby .... · :3n2 F . ~ .. at 2D 
Nothing iu Terry supports an exception to the warrant 
requirement here. 
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States , 397 U. S. 
72 (1970), and United Stales v. Biswell, 406 U. :-i. 311 
( 1972), on which the Government also relies. both con-
cemed the standards which govern inspections of the 
business premises of those with federal licenses to engage 
in the sale of liquor. Colonnade, or the. sale of guns .. 
Bistuell. In those cases. Congress was held to have power 
to authorize \varrantless searches. As the Court stated 
iu Hiswell : 
''When a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively 
<!§u1at:9 business and to accept a federal license,. 
,. 
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he does so with the k110wledge that his business 
records, firearms, and ammunition will be su b.iect 
to effective inspection ." 406 U. S., at 316. 
Colonnade and Biswell cauuot fairly be read to cover 
cases of present typr. One who mf~rely travels in regions 
near the borders of the country can hardly be thought to 
have submitted to inspections r;;' exchange for a speciaL 
perquisite. 
More closely iu point on their facts are the cases in-
volving automobile searches. E. !J., Carroll v. United 
States , 267 U. S. 132 (1925); Charnbers v. Maroney , 
supra; Coolidge v. l\'etu Hampshire, s'upra. But while 
those cas<'s allow automobiles to hP searched without a 
warrant iu certain circumstanePs. the principal ratiouale 
for this Pxception to the warrant elausP is that undPr 
those circumstances "it is not pract,icable to secure a 
warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out 
of the Iocailty or .1 ur1sdwtion in which the warrant must 
hP sought." Carroll v. [1m:ted States, supra, 267 r . ;-;., 
... at Ih3. 'l'he Court today correctly points out that a 
warrantless search under the Carroll li1w of cases must 
be f"Upported by probable causP in the sense of specific 
k1wwlcdge about a particular automobile. While . as iii -
dicated above , my view is that on appropriate facts the 
Uovernment can satisfy the probable cause requirement 
for a roving search in a border area without possessing 
Information about particular automobiles. it does not 
follow that the warrant reguirPmcnt is inapp'Osite . The 
very fact that the Governmpnt's supporting information 
rPlates to criminal activit Ill certam areas rather thaiJ 
-
to evidence a out a partieular automobile renders ir-
rPlevan t the j l!Stifieatwn or warrantless searches relied 
upon in ('arroll and its progeny. Quite simply the rovin!l; :; 
RParches are justified by Pxperience with obviously non -
mobile sPrtions of 1-1 partieular road or arPa l?mbracing· 
several roads. 
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None of the foregoing ' exceptions to the warran t re~ 
quirement, then, applies to ·roving automobile searches 
in border areas. Moreover, the propriety of the war-
rant procedure here is affirmatively established by 
Camara. See also See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 
(1967). For the reasons outlined above, the Court there 
ruled that j)robable cause could be shown for an area 
search, but nonetheless required that a warrant be ob-
-tamed for unconsented searches. The Court indicated 
1ts geueral approach to exceptions to the warrant 
t€'quirement : 
"Ln assessing whether the public interest demands 
creation of a general exception to thP warrant re-
quirement, the question is not whether the public 
interest justifies the type of search ill question, but 
whether the authority to search should be evidenced 
by a warrant, which in turn depends in part upon 
whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely 
to frustrate the governmental purpose behind thP 
search ." 387 U. ;:) ., at 533. 
8ee also United States v. Unite.d States District Court, 
supra, 407 U. ;-;., at 315. 
The Government argues that Camara aud See are dis-
tinguishable from the present case for the purposes of 
the warrant requirement. lt is true that while a build-
mg inspector who is refused admission to a building may 
easily obtaiu a warrant to search that building, a mem-
ber of the Border Patrol has no such opportunitY wheu 
.. he 1s refused permission to inspect an automobile. lt is 
also true that the judicial function envisioned in Camara 
Pxtended principally to the details of the search rather 
than to "the basic agency decision to canvass any area," 
387 U. S., at 532, while the judicial function here would 
pece~sarily include passing on .JUst sueh a hasic deQision 
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But it does not follow from these distinctions that "no 
warrant system can be constructed that would be feasible 
and meaningful." Brief for the United States, at 36. 
Nothing in the papers before us demonstrates that it 
would not be feasible for the Border Patrol to obtaiu. 
advance judicial approval of the decisiOn to conduct 
roving searches on a particular road or roads for a rca- , 
sonab le penod of time." According to the Government , 
the iucidence of illegal transportation of aliens on cer-
tain roads is predictable, and the roving searches are 
apparently planned in advance or carried out according 
to a predetermined schedu le. The use of an area war-
rant procedure would surely not ''frustrate the govern-
mental purposP behind the sParch ." Camara \'. Mu-
nu:ipal Court, supra, :37H l' . 1'1 ., at 5:)3. lt would of -coursP Pntail some inconvenience, but in_c_o-nv-e-,t-li_e_llc-·p-
alO'ile has never been thought to be an adequate reasou 
for abrogatmg the warraut req mremelit. E. g., Ontte:a 
States v. Untted States Dtstnct ( 'uurl, s·upra, 407 l' . H., 
at 021 
Although standards for probable cause in the context 
of this case are relatively unstructured (ef. United States 
v. ( ·m:ted States District ('o·urt, supra, 407 U. :::1., at 322). 
there are a number of relevant factors which would merit 
consideration : they include ( i) the frequency with which 
aliens tllegally w the country arc"known or /'eaSOimbly 
believed to be transported w1 th Ill a particular area; 
¥ )ol.. ( ii) the proximity of the area in question to the border ; 
r ,, ~ (iii) the extensiveness and geographic characteristics of 




· Tlwn• Is no rea~un why a judiciHl oflie<>r co1Ild nut approve whe>re 
<t pproprwt<> a ~ene~ of roving ~earclws over tlw couri:iP of i:iC've>ral 
day~ or wc•Pb Exprnenre Witli Hn mitinl HParch or HPrie~ of i:iearche~ 
would bP lnghl~ - rei evant 111 f'On~idPrmg <I pphca t tons for rr'JIE'W<Il of 
;1 WHffHIII , 
{.oY?,~~~ 
Ill',/ ~ /( 
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their use; and (iv) the probable degree of interference 
with the rights of innocent persons, taking into account 
~the scope of the proposed search, its duration , and the 
~ • \. demo Ta · 1arac ens 1cs o t e area. ' . ~ Pr- n short, the determination of .w et wr a warr~nt ~- . 
l r should be issued for an area search mvolves a b~lanctng . ·, n · 
J of the legitimatt' interests of law euforcement w1th pro-~ · ';;./ 
tected Fourth Amendment rights. This presents the type 
of delicate questiou of constitutional judgment which ~:~ 
ought to be resolved by the Judiciary r·ather than the -~=--ff:===u""'-n:""'.=---a-4..& 
Executiw. In the words of Camam. ·4_ ~ I , "" 
"This iK precisely the disrrC'tio JJ to invade private ~ -~ 
property which we have rousistently circumscribed 
by a req mrcmen t that a disinterested party warrant 
t,l!e ne<:'d to search " :{87 l '. S., at t>3:Z- 533. 
~or does th<' Jlovelty of the problelll posed by rov.in~ 
searches in border areas undermine the importance of a 
prior judicial determinatio11. When faced with a sim-
ilarly UJlconventional problem last Tenu in United State:o 
Distn:ct Court. supra, we recognized that the focus of tlw 
search therr involved was "less precise than that directrd 
against more con ventwnal types of crime,' ' and that, 
"ldJifferent sta11dards may be compatible with the 
Fourth Amepdmen t if they are reasonable both in rela-
Llon to the legitimate need of government . .. and the 
protcetrd rights of our cit1zens." 407 U. ~ .. at 322- 32:3. 
Yet we refused to abandon the Fourth Amendment com-
' TkpL'lldlllg upon tlw c·m·um~lnnc·t ·~, rh!'l'( ' m:ty IH' prubnblt• L'<l\IH ' 
for lh(' ~eHrcb to [J(' Httthori~ed uni)· for 11 dC'~1gn11tC'd portron of 11 
p:trtJl'tt!ar road or ~ll('h ra t t~t· m11~ · ext ~ t lor 11 t lc>~rgnated nrPa winch 
ma.1· contam one or more road~ or track~ Partrrularly along much 
of t h(• \Jexrcan border, thl'l't' nn' va,:t an'a" of umnhHb tted dt>"Prt 
and and land wluch 11rc• t ra vPnwd b)· fL'W , rf any , main road~ or 
lughw11y~. but w hreh nrvL·rt Jwlra~ ma~· 11 fford opportuni IJC'H- h,\ 
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mitment to the use of search warrants whenever this is 
feasible with due regard to the interests affected. 
For the reasons stated above , I think a rational search 
warrant procedure is feasible in cases of this kind. As 
no warrant was obtained here, I agree that the judgment 
must be reversed. I express no opinion as to whether 
there was probable cause to issue a warrant on the facts 
of this particular cas . 
' f 
CHAM BERS OF 
.JU STICE BYRON R. W HITE 
.itt;lfttltt Qfltttrl ttf tqt 'Jtti:tt~ .ibtf.tg 
'llagltittghtn. ~. <If. 21JgiJt,~ 
June 11, 1973 
Re: No. 71-6278 - Almeida-Sanchez v. United States 
Dear Lewis: 
Thank you for an early look at your proposed circu-
lation in this case. I have examined it with some care 
over the weekend. My own judgment now is that if the case 
is to be reversed -- as it now will be your opinion 
should become the opinion for the Court. If it proves 
necessary to achieve that result, I would recommend that 
those of us who preferred affirmance would state our doubts 
in a concurring opinion but acquiesce in yours. Doing so 
would ensure a Court opinion, rather than a judgment 
supported by differing views. It would also make plain what 
might otherwise be obscure: that a majority of the Court 
would not require probable cause in the traditional sense 
for the issuance of a warrant to search vehicles for aliens 
in areas near the border . 
The remaining premise for so recommending to my 
colleagues is, with all due respect, that requiring an area 
warrant in advance is not a matter of great moment. Camara 
-2-
and See were of significance in that they rejected the 
Frank v. Maryland limitation of the Fourth Amendment to 
strictly criminal contexts and recognized the inherent 
flexibility of the concept of probable cause. The warrant 
requirement itself was designed for what was deemed a narrow 
class of cases but one the majority thought deserved protec-
tion. Perhaps it did, but based on the feedback I have had 
or noted, the impact of this aspect of those cases has not 
been impressive. But whether or not Camara is persuasive 
here and independent of that case, your insistence on 
warrants is arguably supportable as a hedge against possible 
abuses of the roving search in individual cases or areas. 
It should not prevent any of the stops and searches that 
now occur. I can live with that as long as it does not make 
a difficult task substantially more so or impossible. 
Of course, I have not conferred with any of the other 
Justices who have joined my circulation. If they have other 
views, I would very likely remain in dissent. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
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'IJz:tgfringhttt. I£1. <!f. 20,?'-~.;t 
..JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
June 11, 1973 
MEMORANDUM TO: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
The enclosed is the kind of concurrence 
I had in mind in connection with joining Lewis 
Powell's approach in Almeida-Sanche z 
















JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
~ttprtmt' <f onrt (If tlt.c ';tl.nitdt ,§tatfg 
'J[Ta9lyittgtl1n, p. <!):. 20.5}~;3 
June 11, 1973 
Re: No. 71-6278 - Almeida-Sanchez v. United States 
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring~ 
The governing test in Fourth Amendment cases is 
that of reasonableness, Cady v. Dombrowski, post ____ • 
The judgment of Congress, the lower ' courts, and those 
administering the immigration laws has uniformly been that 
because of the problems inherent in preventing illegal 
entries by aliens, neither warrant nor probable cause should 
be required in every case where a vehicle is searched for 
aliens either at the border or in areas near thereto. That 
judgment appears sufficiently reasonable to me to agree 
without reservation with Parts I and II of the Court's opinion. 
It also raises considerable doubt in my mind with respect to 
- 2 -
the necessity for securing warrants to support stops and 
searches by roving border patrols. But I acquiesce in 
and join Part Iii of the Court's opinion. How much 
protection the warrant will afford in this context I am 
unsure. But it may prevent some abuses; and, as the Court 
points out, searches normally must be supported by warrant. 
At the same time, it does not appear to me t 1 1at requiring 
the warrant contemplated by the Court's opinion will place 
insuperable obstacles in the way of performing what is 
already a difficult job or substantially reduce the authority 
of the roving patrol in sensitive areas near the border such 
as the one involved here appears to be. 
June 11, 1973 
No. 71-6278 Almeida-Banebez v. u.s. 
Dear Petter and Byron: 
As the "man in the middle" in the above case, I am beginning 
to wtsb I bad not written at all 
I will try to meet with both of you to discuss this, but thought 
tt might be helpful if I indicated the "options" which appear to be 
anUable - as I see them: 
1. Adhere to the "line up" and opinicms as circulated prior to 
today, plus my cc:mcurrence. 
2. If agreeable to the Justices who were with Byron, his proposal 
circulated today could be adopted and my opinion revised to become a 
Court opinion with .Byron ftlin.g a cc:mcurrence (in wbieb one or more 
Justices might join). 
- 3. In view of changes made by Petter In his opinion (draft of 
6/11), I could (a) join his result and also file my concurrence or (b) 
join b<tb his opin1Cil and result, and file my concurrence. • 
If the two of you could reach agreement as to which of these is 
best for the Court, I would acquiesce readily. 
If left entirely to my own persc:mal preference, I would simply 
leave my oplnioo as a coocurrence. It was net written as an opinion 
*ll iiJ is decided that I should join Petter, I assume he would make 1t 
clear that he does not address the remedy for the problem. 
•. 
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for the Court, and I would have to change it substantially to put it in proper 
form for that purpose. 
I do not relish being in the positioo of ''taldng away" from any 
Justice an optnloo on which he has labored long and well. This 1s 
especially true as to both of you whom I hold in the higbest respect. 
In sum, I will cheerfully accept any resolutioo that you think is in the 
best interests of the Court, althoagb my purely perscmal preference 
ta lndlcated above. 
Mr. Justice stewart 
Mr. Justice White 
lfp/ss 
Sincerely, 
.June 11, 1973 
No. 71-6278 Almeida-Sanchez v. u.s. 
Dear Potter and Byron: 
As the 11man in the middleu in the above case, I am beginning 
to wish I had not written at all. 
I will try to meet with both of you to discuss this, but thought 
it mi~t be helpful if I indicated the ' 'pptions" now available -as I 
see them: 
1. Adhere to the "line up" and opinions as circulated prior to 
today, plus my concurrence. 
2. If agreeable to the Justices who were with Byron. his propoeal 
circulated today could be adopted and my opinion revised to become a 
Court opinion with Byron filing a concurrence (in which one or more 
Justices might join). 
- 3. In view ol changes made by Potter in hls opinion (draft of 
6/11), I could(~ join hts result and also flle my concurrence or (b) 
joift beth his opinion and result, and file my cooeurrenee. 
If the two of yoa could reach agreement as to which of these is 
best for the Court, I would acquiesce readUy. 
:r left entit"Gly to my awn persmal preference, I am inclined to 
prefer option 3(a) or 3(b). My concurrence was not written as an opinion 
for the Court, and I would have to change It substant!ally to put it in proper 
form for that purpose. Moreover, my ccmcurrence goes somewhat beymd 
what ts necessary for a Court opinion in that I suggest, In effect, an 
-2-
affirmative answer to the problem. While this is certainly not una10wn 
in our opinions, there may be some merit .. espec:ially where the answer 
suggested is not incompatible with the plurality or Court opinion- for 
aUirmative solutions to be included in a concurrence. 
Perhaps I should add that I do not reliSh being in the ,position 
of 'taking awayn from any Justice an ophlloo an which be has labored 
long and well. This is especially true as to beth of you whom I bold 
Jil the highest respect. In sum, I will cheerfully accept :m:v; resolution 
that you think is in the best interests of the Court, although my purely 
personal preference is indicated above. 
Mr. Justice stewart 
fitr. Justice \Vhtte 
lfp/ss 
Sincerely, 
JWle 11, 1973 
No. 71-6278 Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S. 
Dear Potter and Byron: 
As the •·man in the middle" 1n the above case, I am beginning 
to wish I had not written at 11. 
I will try to meet with both of you to discuss this, but thought 
it might be helpful if I indicated the '"pptionsu now available .. as I 
see them: 
1. Adhere to the "line upu and opinions as circulated prior to 
today, plus my concurrence. 
2. If agreeable to the Justices who were with Byron, his proposal 
circulated today could be adopted and my opinion revised to become a 
Court oplnioo with Byron filing a concurrence (in hich one or more 
Justices might join). 
- 3. In view of changes made by Potter in his opinion (draft of 
6/11), I eould ( ~ join his result and also file my concurrence or (b) 
join Wh his opinion and result, and file my concurrence. 
If the two of you could reach agreement as to which of these is 
st for the Court, I would acquiesce readily. 
I left entil"ely to y own personal preference, I am inclined to 
prefer option 3(a) or 3(b). My concurrence was not written as an opinion 
for the Court, and I would have to change it substantially to put it in proper 
form for that purpose. oreover, my emeurrence goes somewhat beyond 
what is necessary for a Court opinion in that I suggest, in effect, an 
-2-
aHtrmative answer to the problem. While this is eertainly not unknown 
in our opinions, there may be some merit - especially where the answer 
suggested is not incompatible with the plurality or Coart opinion .. for 
affirmative solutions to be included in a concurrence. 
Perhaps I should add tbat I do not relish being in the position 
of 'taking away" from any Justice an opinion on which he has labored 
long and well. This is especially true as to bdh of you whom I hold 
in the highest respect. In sum, I will cheerfully accept .any resolution 
that you think is in the best interests of the Court, although 1ny purely 
personal preference is indicated above. 
?"tr. Justice stewart 
Mr. Justice illite 
lfp/ss 
Sincerely, 
June 11, 1973 
No. 71-6278 Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S. 
Dear Potter and Byron: 
As the "man in the middle" in the above case, I am begbming 
to wish I had not written at all 
I will try to meet with b<th of you to discuss this, but thought 
it might be helpful if I indicated the "options" which appear to be 
available - as I see them: 
1. Adhere to the "line up" and opinions as circulated prior to 
today, plus my concurrence .. 
2. If agreeable to the Justices who were with Byron, his proposal 
circulated today could be adopted and my opinion revised to become a 
Court opinion with 'Byron filing a concurrence (in which one or more 
Justices might join). 
- 3. In view of changes made by Potter in his opinion (draft of 
6/11), I could (a) join his result and also file my concurrence or (b) 
join beth his opinion and result, and file my concurrence.* 
If the two of you could reach agreement as to which of these is 
best for the Court, I would acquiesce readily. 
If left entirely to my own persooal preference, I would simply 
leave my opinion as a concurrence. It was net written as an opinion 
* , ts decided that I should join Potter, I assume he would make it 
clear that he does not address the remedy for the problem. 
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for the Court, and I would have to change it substantially to put it in proper 
form for that purpose. 
I do not relish being in the position of "taking away" from any 
Justice an opinion on which he has labored long and well This is 
especially true as to both of you whom I hold in the highest respect. 
In sum, I will cheerfully accept any resolutioo that you think is in the 
best interests of the Court, although my purely persmal preference 
ts indicated above. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
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June 11, 1973 
No. 71-6278 Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S. 
Dear Potter and Byron: 
As the "man in the middle" in the above case, I am beginning 
to wish I had not written at all. 
I will try to meet with both of you to discuss this, but thought 
it might be helpful if I indicated the "options" which appear to be 
available - as I see them: 
1. Adhere to the "line up" and opinions as circulated prior to 
today, plus my concurrence. 
2. If agreeable to the Justices who were with Byron, his proposal 
circulated today could be adopted and my opinion revised to become a 
Court opinion with Byron filing a concurrence (in which one or more 
Justices might join). 
3. In view of changes made by Potter in his opinion (draft of 
6/11), I could (a) join his result and also file my concurrence or (b) 
join both his opinion and result, and file my concurrence. * 
If the two of you could reach agreement as to which of these is 
best for the Court, I would acquiesce readily. 
If left entirely to my own personal preference, I would simply 
leave my opinion as a concurrence. It was not written as an opinion 
*If it is decided that I should join Potter, I assume he would make it 
clear that he does not address the remedy for the problem. 
- 2 -
for the Court, and I would have to change it substantially to put it in proper 
form for that purpose. 
I do not relish being in the position of "taking away" from any 
Justice an opinion on which he has labored long and well. This is 
especially true as to both of you whom I hold in the highest respect. 
In sum, I will cheerfully accept any resolution that you think is in the 
best interests of the Court, although my purely personal preference 
is indicated above. 
Mr. Justice stewart 
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June 11, 1973 
No. 71-6278 Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S. 
Dear Potter and Byron: 
-
I I 
As the "man in the middle" in the above case, I am beginning 
to wish I had not written at all. 
I will try to meet with both of you to discuss this, but thought 
it might be helpful if I indicated the 11options" now available - as I 
see them: 
1. Adhere to the "line up" and opinions as circulated prior to 
today, plus my concurrence. 
2. If agreeable to the Justices who were with Byron, his proposal 
circulated today could be adopted and my opinion revised to become a 
Court opinion with Byron filing a concurrence (in which one or more 
Justices might join). 
3. In view of changes made by Potter in his opinion (draft of 
6/11), I could (a) join his result and also file my concurrence or (b) 
join both his opinion and result, and file my concurrence. 
If the two of you could reach agreement as to which of these is 
best for the Court, I would acquiesce readily. 
1f left entirely to my own personal preference, I am inclined to 
prefer option 3(a) or 3(b). My concurrence was not written as an opinion 
for the Court, and I would have to change it substantially to put it in proper 
form for that purpose. Moreover, my concurrence goes somewhat beyond 
what is necessary for a Court opinion in that I suggest, in effect, an 
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affirmative answer to the problem. While this is certainly not unknown 
in our opinions, there may be some merit - especially where the answer 
suggested is not incompatible with the plurality or Court opinion - for 
affirmative solutions to be included in a concurrence. 
Perhaps I should add that I do not relish being in the position 
of "taking away" from any Justice an opinion on which he has labored 
long and well. This is especially true as to both of you whom I hold 
in the highest respect. In sum, I will cheerfully accept any resolution 
that you think is in the best interests of the Court, although my purely 
personal preference is indicated above. 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Mr. Justice White 
lfp/ss 
Sincerely, 
June 12, 1973 
No. 71-6278 Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S. 
Dear Byron: 
Althoup,h T nay ns · " arry to interpret for me the precise import 
of your parable of l""' "':, 'f' • einf•. caught off base by 95 feet, I take it 
that ... ~ otter's opinion wi.u now become that of the Court. 
As otter 1as su1--:stantially modified his first circulation 
(removing most of the language that troubled me), I will now join his 
opinion to give him a Court and, of course, file my concurring opinion. 
It seems to me that this combination, including your dissent, will afford 
the guidance to the Justice Department and others that I was anxious t o 
provide. 
1 am a bit contrite at unwittingly causing you to classify yourself 
with AI Bumbry, although on the baseball diamond (at least) I would 
still consider this quite a compliment. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice White 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF -
~u.pumt <!Jtturl ttf tJrt 'Jlfuittb .:%tmu 
'Jlirasfri:n.ghnt. ~. <q. 21lgt~~ 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
June 12, 1973 
Re: No. 71-6278 - Almeida-Sanchez v. United States 
Dear Byron: 
Having pondered overnight the suggestion contained 
in your memorandum of yesterday, that the four of us who 
joined in your proposed opinion for the Court in this case 
should now join Lewis' opinion, I am inclined against 
following it. It seems to me that a sentence or two added 
to your proposed opinion, which would now be a dissent, 
would make clear that for the four of us Lewis' administrative 
warrant solution would be acceptable a fortiori. While I 
do not mean to completely shut the door on further discussion, 
I agreed with your opinion when you wrote it, I still agree 
with it, and would prefer to stick with it. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice White 
Copy to: The Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Ptlif.-
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
,ju.p-rttnt {!fllltrt cf tqt 'Jttttittlt .itmrs 
~asJ:ringtcn. 10. <!f. 2IT.;t,_1~ 
June 12, 1973 
No. 71-6278 Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S .. 
Dear Byron: 
Although I may ask Harry to interpret for me the precise import 
of your parable of Bumbry's being caught off base by 95 feet, I take it 
that Potter's opinion will now become that of the Court. 
As Potter has substantially modified his first circulation 
(removing most of the language that troubled me), I will now join his 
opinion to give him a Court and, of course, file my concurring opinion. 
It seems to me that this combination, including your dissent, will afford 
the guidance to the Justice Department and others that I was anxious to 
provide. 
I am a bit contrite at unwittingly causing you to classify yourself 
with Al Bumbry, although on the baseball diamond (at least) I would 
still consider this quite a compliment. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice White 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
,ju:prtmt Qj:oud of t:Jrt ~b- ,jtNftg 
11JagJri:nghm. ~. Qj:. 2ll.;t'!.;l 
C H A.MBE.RS O F 
JUSTICE BYRON F'? WHITE 
June 12, 1973 
Re: No. 71-6278 -Almeida-Sanchez v. United States 
Dear Lewis: 
As you know, I cannot deliver the votes to join 
your opinion. I shall, therefore, remain in dissent. 
I am reminded of the Orioles-Twins game the other 
night. The Orioles were at bat in the third inning, seven 
runs behind and with one out. Al Bumbry singled. Coggins 
then hit a long drive to left field. Bumbry, who is 
lightning-fast, thought the ball would never be caQght and 
took off for home plate. He got almost to third before 
realizing that Jim Holt in left field had indeed caught 
the ball and was rifling it to the infield. Coggins never 
got back even to second. He had the distinction of being 
out by 95 feet. His manager said it was just bad judg-
ment -- when you are seven runs behind and the play is in 
front of you, you have to make sure the ball isn't caught 
before taking off for home. 
Sincerely, 
~~~ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to Conference 
June 12, 1973 
No. 71-6278 Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S. 
Dear Potter: 
In accord with the exchange of notes between Byron and me, 
I now join your opinion for the Court. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice stewart 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMSERS OF 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
.®u:.prtmt <.qcttrt cf tqt 'Jllttibb .:§tafts 
2Jia:ilfrbrgtcn. IB. <.q. Zll~J.t~ 
June 15, 1973 
Re: No. 71-6278 - Almeida-Sanchez v. United States 
Dear Byron: 





Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
'· 
-· 
~up-rttm (!Jlllttt ltf t4t ~ttittb ~mttg 
.,.-agfrhtghm. ![l. <!J. 2Llgt>!-~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
June 15, 1973 
Re: No. 71-6278 - Almeida-Sanchez v. U.S. 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me in your dissent. 
Sincerely, 
II r;. 6. 
Mr. Justice White 
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the rnited States Court 
of Appeals for the Kiuth 
Circuit. 
;[June 21. 1073] 
MH. Ju::>TICE PowELL. concurring. 
While I join tiH' opinion of the Court. which sufficiently 
establishes that none' of our Fourth Amendment decisions 
supports the search conducted in this case. I add this 
concurring opinion to elaborate on my views as to the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment in this context. 
We are confronted here with the all too familiar 
necessity of reconciling a legitimate ueed of govcmmeut 
with constitutionally protected rights. There can be 
no question as to the seriousness and legitimacy of the 
law enforcement problem with respect to enforcing along 
thousands of miles of open border valid immigration and 
related la,vs. Xor can there be a ny question as to the 
necessity. in our frt'P society. of safeguarding persons 
against S(>arclws and S('izures proscribed by the Fourth 
Amendment. I beliPve that a resolution of the issu{' 
raised by this caS(' is possible with due recognition of both 
of these interests. and in a manner compatible \vith the 
prior decisions of this ( 'ourt. 1 
I 
The search here involved was carried out as part of a 
roving search of automobiles in an area generally proxi-
1 I am Ill aeeord with th(' Court'~ collelu~ioll that uothiug iu 
§ 2S7 (a) of tlw lmmigrHtioll nlld ;\atiolla!it.' · Act. 1-1 ll. S.C.§ 1:{57 
(a). or in 1-i CFH :2S7.1 ~rrw~ to authorir.P all otlwrwi~<· \lll('Oll~ti­
tutionnl ~rn rrh , 
71-n1is-coxcrn 
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mate to the :VIexican bonkr. lt \\'as not a border search. 
nor can it fairly be said to ha V<' been a search con-
ducted at the "functional equivalent" of th<• bord£•r. 
Xor do<·s this casr involv<' the constitutional propriety 
of searches at permanent or temporary check points 
removed from the bordrr or its functional equivalent. 
Xor. finally. ,,·as the S!'arch based 011 cause in the ordi-
nary sense of specific kno\\'lrdge conc<'l'lling an auto-
nwbile or its passengers." The questioll posed. rather. is 
whether and under \\hat circumstances thr Border Patrol 
may lawfully conduct roving searches of automobiles in 
areas not far removed from the border for the purpose 
of apprehending aliens illegally entering or in the country. 
The Government has made a convincing showing that 
large numbers of aliens cross our borders illegally at places 
other than established crossing points. that they are often 
assisted by smugglers. that even those who cross on foot 
are met and transported to their destinations by auto-
mobiles. and that roving checks of automobiles are the 
only feasible means of apprehending them. It would. 
of course. be v\·holly impracticable to maintain a con-
stant patrol along thousands of miles of border. More-
over, because many of these aliens cross the border on 
foot. or at places other than established checkpoints. it 
is simply not possible in most cases for the Government 
to obtain specific knowledge that a person riding or-
stowed in an automobile is an ailen illegally ill the coun-
"Thr Soli('itor Urnc·ral '~ briPf in thi~ Comt ,:tate,: c·xpliC'iti~- that 
' 'Vi'f' ... do uot tak<' tht• po,:ition that thr C'h<'('kiug oprratiou~ arC' 
jn~tifird br<·au~r the· ollie('!'~ havt• probaiJI<· cau~<· ur <'Yl'll ·rrn~onnble 
tiUtipicion ' to bPiirvP, \\'ith l'<'~p<·rt to Pach Hhiclr chrrk<·d, that it 
contains an illrgal alien. Ap:1rt from the n·a~ouabiPtl<':>"' of P~tnbli~h­
mrnt of thr rhrcking O]l('l':ltioll i11 thi" <'<N'. thrrP i~ nothing in the 
rr<·orcl to indieatr that thr Border l'atrol otti('N~ had all~· ~Jlt'<"ial or 
particular rra~on to ~top prtition<'r and ('Xaminr hi~ ear ." Bric·f fof.. 
the United Statr~ , pp . 9-10 .. 
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try. Thus thC' magnitude of the problem is clear. An 
answer. reconciling the obvious needs of law enforcement 
with relevant constitutional rights. is far less clear. 
II 
The Government's argument to sustai11 the search here 
is simply that it was reasonable under the circum-
sta11ces. But it is by no~· axiomatic that the Fourth 
Amendment's proscription of "unreasonable searches and 
seizures" is to be read in conjunction with its command 
that "no Warrants shall issue. but upo11 probable cause.'' 
Under our cases. both the concept of probable cause and 
~he requirement of a warrant bear on the reasonableness 
of a search. though in certain limited circumstances 
neither is required. 
Before deciding whether a warrant is required. I will 
first address the threshold question of whether some func-
tional equivalent of probable cause may exist for the type 
of search conducted in this case. The problem of ascer-
taining the meaning of the probable cause requirement 
~n the context of roving searches of the sort conducted 
here is measurably assisted by the Court's opunon in 
(}mnara v. Municipal Court, 387 l'". S. 523 ( 1967). on 
'vhich the Government relies hca.vily. The Court was 
there concerned with the nature of the probable cause 
{equirement in the context of searches to identify housing 
code violations and was persuaded that the only workable 
method of enforcement was periodic inspection of all 
structures: 
"It is here that the probable cause debate is focused. 
for the agency 's decision to conduct an area in-
spection is unavoidably based on its appraisal of 
conditions in the area as a ,.,·hole, not on its knowl-
~dge of cond,itions in each particular building." 387 
U. S., at 536. 
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In concluding that such general knowledge met the 
probable cause requirernent under those circumstances. 
the Court took note of a "long history of judicial and 
public acceptance." of the absence of other methods for 
vindicating the public interest in preventing or abating 
dangerous conditions. and of the limited invasion of pri-
vacy occasioned by administrative inspections which are 
"neither personal in nature nor aimed at discovery of 
evidence of crime." /.d .. , at 537. 
Roving automobile searches in border regions for aliens. 
likewise. have been consisteutly approved by the judi-
ciary. While the question is one of first impression in 
this Court. such searches uniformly have been sustained 
by the courts of appeals whose jurisdictions include those 
areas of the border between Mexico and the United States 
where the problem has been most severe. See, e. g., 
United States v. Miranda, 426 F. 2d 283 ( CA9 1970); 
Roa-Rodriguez v. United States, 410 F. 2d 1206 (CAlO 
1969). Moreover, as noted above. no alternative solu-
tion is · reasonably possible. 
The Government further argues that such searches 
resemble those conducted in Camara in that they are 
undertaken primarily for administrative rather tha.n 
prosecutorial purposes. that their function is simply to 
locate those who are illegally here and to deport them. 
Brief for the United States. p. 28 11. 25. This argument 
is · supported by the assertion that only 3'/r of aliens 
appreheuderl in this country are prosecuted. While the 
low rate of prosecution offers no great solace to the 
innocent whose automobiles are searched or to the few 
who are prosecuted. it does serve to differentiate this 
class of searches from random area searches which are no 
more than "fishing expeditions" for evidence to support 
prosecutions. The possibility of prosecution does not 
distinguish such searches from those in valved in Camara. 
Despite the Court's assertion in that case that the searches. 
71-li27~COXCCH 
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were not "aimed at the discovery of crime." 387 U. S .. 
~t 537, violators of the housing code there were subject 
to criminal penalties. !d., at 527 n. 2. 
Of perhaps greater weight is the fact that these 
searches. according to the Government. are conducted in 
areas ;vhere the concentratio11 of illegally-present aliens 
is high. both in absolute terms and in proportion to the 
number of persons legally present. While these searches 
are not border searches in the conventional sense. they 
are incidental to the protection of the border and draw 
a large measure of justification from the Government's 
extraordinary responsibilities and powers with respect to 
the border. Finally. and significantly, these are searches 
of automobiles rather than searches of persons or build-
iJ\gs. The search of an automobile is far less intrusive 
Ol) the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment than 
the search of one's person or of a building. This Court 
"has long distinguished between an automobile and a 
home or offic~.'' Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42. 48 
(1970). As the Govemment has demonstrated. and as 
those in the affected areas surely know, it is the auto-
mobile which in most cases makes effective the attempts 
to smuggle aliens into this country. 
The conjunction of these factors-consistent judicial 
approval. absence of a reasonable alternative for the 
solution of a serious problem. and only a modest intrusion 
on those ,,.,·hose automobiles are searched-persuades 
me that under appropriate limiting circumstances there 
may exist a constitutionally adequate equivalent of prob-
able cause to conduct roving vehicular searches in border 
areas. 
III 
The conclusion that there may be probable cause to 
conduct roving searches does not end the inquiry, for 
"except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a. 
'i1-6:2i8-CO~C1JR 
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search of private property without proper consent is 
'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid 
search warrant.' ' Camara v. Afu11iciJ)(ll Court, supra! 
387 U. S .. at 5:28. 5:20. 1 expressed the view last Term 
that the warrant clause reflects an important policy de~ 
termination: "The Fourth Amendment does not conw 
teinplate the executive officers of Government as neutral 
and disinterested magistrates. Their duty and responsi-
bility is to enforce the laws, to investigate and to prose-
cute . . . . But those charged with this investigative 
and prosecutorial duty should not be the sole judges of 
when to utilize constitutionally sensitive means in pursu-
ing their tasks." U11ited States v. United States District 
Court, 407 U. S. 297, 317 ( 1972). See also Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 481 (1971); Chimel v. 
California, 395 U. S. 752, 763- 764 (1969). 
To justify warrantless searches in circumstanes like 
those presented in this case, the Government relies upon 
several of this Court's decisions recognizing exceptions 
to the warrant requirement. · A brief review of the nature 
of each of these major exceptions illuminates the rele-
vant considerations in the present case. In Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1 (1968). the Court held that a policeman may 
conduct a limited "pat down" search for weapons when 
he· has reasonable grounds for believing that criminal 
conduct has taken or is taking place and that the person 
he searches is armed and dangerous. "The sole j ustifi-
cation r for such a ., search . . . is the protection of the 
police officer and others nearby. · .. · ." 392 U. S.J at 29. 
Nothing in Terry supports an exception to the warrant 
requirement here. 
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U. S. 
72 (1970), and United Stales v. Biswell, 406 U. S. 311 
(1972), on which the Government also relies. both con-
cerned the standards which govern inspections of the 
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business premises of those with federal licenses to engage 
in the sale of liquor. Colonnade, or the sale of guns. 
Biswell. In those cases. Congress was held to have power 
to authorize warrantless searches. As the Court stated 
in B-is'well: 
"When a dealer chooses to engage in this pervasively 
regulated business ami to accept a federal license. 
he does so with the knowledge that his business 
records, firearms. and ammunition will be subject 
to effective inspection... 406 e. S .. at 316. 
Colonnade and Biswell cannot fairly be read to cover 
cases of present type. One who merely travels in regions 
near the borders of the cou11try can hardly be thought to 
have submitted to inspections in exchange for a special 
perquisite. 
More closely in point on their facts are the cases in-
volving automobile searches. E. g., Carroll v. United 
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Chambers v. Maroney, 
supra; Coolidge v . .Yew Hampshire, supra. But while 
those cases allow automobiles to be searched without a 
warrant in certain circumstances. the principal rationale 
for this exception to the warrant clause is that under 
those circumstances "it is not practicable to secure a 
warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out 
of the locality or jurisdiction in which the ,,·arrant must. 
be sought.'' Carroll \'.United States, supra, 267 'C. S .. 
at 153. The Court today correctly points out that a 
warrantless search under the Carroll line of cases must 
be supported by probable cause in the sense of specific 
knO\vledge about a particular automobile. While, as in-
dicated above, my view is that on appropriate facts the 
Governmeut can satisfy the probable cause requirement 
for a roving search in a border area v,:ithout possessiug 
information about particular automobiles. it does not 
follow that the warrant requirement is inapposite. The 
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very fact that the Government's supporti11g infonnatiou 
relates to cri1ninal activity in certain areas rather than 
to · eviuence about a particular automobile renders ir-
relevant the justification for warrantless searches relied 
upon in Carroll and its progeny. quite simply the roving 
searches are justified by experience with obviously non-
mobile sections of a particular road or area embracillg 
several roads. 
i\one of the foregoing exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement. then. applies to roving automobile searches 
in border areas. Moreover. the propriety of the war-
rant procedure here is affirmatively established by 
Camara. See also See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 
( 1967). For the reasons outlined above, the Court there 
ruled that probable cause could be shown for an area 
search. but nonetheless required that a. warrant be ob-
tained for unconsented searches. The Court indicated 
its geueral approach to exceptions to the warrant. 
requirement: 
"In assessing whether the public interest demanus 
creation of a general exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment's vvarrant requirement. the question is not 
whether the public interest justifies the type of 
search in question. but "·hether the authority to 
search should be evidenced by a warrant. which in 
turn depends in part upo11 whether the burden of 
obtaining a vvan·ant is likely to frustrate the gov-
ernmental purpose behind the search." 387 U. S., 
at 533. 
See also United States v. United States District Court, 
supra, 407 U. S .. at 315. 
The Government argues that Camara and See a.re dis-
tinguishable from the present case for the purposes of 
the warrant requirement. It is true that while a build-
ing inspector who is refused admission to a building may 
easily obtain a warra,.nt to ~Search that building, a mem-
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ber of the Border Patrol has 110 such opportunity \vhcn 
he is refused permission to inspect an automobile. It is 
also true that the judicial function envisioned i11 Ca'lll.ara 
did not extend to reconsideration of "the basic agency 
decision to canvass any area,'' 387 'C. S .. at 532, while 
the judicial function here would necessarily include pass-
ing on just such a basic decision. 
But it does not follov..· from these distinctions that "no 
warrant system can be constructed that would be feasible 
and meaningful." Brief for the United States, at 36. 
Nothing in the papers before us demonstrates that it 
would not be feasible for the Border Patrol to obtain 
advance judicial approval of the decision to conduct 
roving searches on a particular road or roads for a rea-
sonable period of time." According to the Government, 
the incidence of illegal transportation of aliens on cer-
tain roads is predictable, and the roving searches are 
apparently planned in advance or carried out according 
to a predetermined schedule. The use of an area war-
rant procedure would surely not "frustrate the govern-
mental purpose behind the search." Camara v. 1lfu-
nicipal Court, supra, 387 'G. S .. at 533. It would of 
course entail some inconvenience. but inconvenience 
alone has never been thought to be an adequate reason 
for abrogating the warrant requirement. E. (J., United 
States \'. United States District Court, supra, 407 U. S .. 
at 321. 
Although standards for probable cause in the context 
of this case arc relatively unstructured ( cf. United States 
v. United States District Court, supra, 407 U.S., at 322). 
there are a number of relevant factors which would merit 
:J There i~ no rc:1~011 wh~· a judi<'inl offit·Pr rould not approve whcrc 
appropriate n ~>eric·~ of roving ~earehe~ O\'Pr tlw eum~c of 8CVC'r:tl 
da~·" or wePh. ExpNic•ncE' with Hll initial ~carrh or ~Prie:-: of ~>earcheti 
would bc bight~· rclcvant in con~idering application~ for renewal of 
a wnrr~nt, 
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COilsid<>ratioil: tlwy include• ( i) tiH• frequt•ncy with whieh 
alirns illegally i11 the c·ouiltry are known or rrasona.bly 
l)('lirved to lH' transportc·d witbi11 a particular ar<'a; 
(ii) the• proximity of tlw an·a ill quc•stioll to tlw border; 
(iii) the· c•xtc·nsi vc•nrss a11d gc•ogra phic characteristics of 
thr ar<·a. iiiCluding tlw roads thc•reill a11d thP extent of 
thc•ir us<'.' and ( iv) the• probable• dC'grcr of iilterf<'rf'ncc· 
with the rights of innocent pe•rsons. takillg into account 
tlw scop<' of the proposed search. its duratiO il. alld the 
concrntratioil of illegal alic'll tralhe ill n·lation to the 
gell<'ral traffic of the road or an•a. 
In short. the• determi11ation of whether a warrant 
should be issued for an area search involves a balancing 
of tlw legitimatt' i11terests of law rnforcement \Vith pro-
tected Fourth Amendment rights. This presellts the type 
of delicate question of constitutional judgment which 
ought to be resolved by the Judiciary rather than the 
Executive•. In the \vords of C'amara, 
"This is precisely the discretion to in vade private 
pro1wrty which we havr consistently circumscribed 
by a requirement that a disinterested party warrant 
the nf'ed to sc•arch... :-387 e. S .. at 532-5:33. 
X or dot's tlw novelty of the problem posed by roving 
searches in bordc•r areas undenniiiC' the importance of a 
prior .iudicial detC'rmination. Wlwn faced with a sim-
ilarly unconv<'IItional problem last Term in [ 1nited State:> 
District Court, s·upm, we n•cognized that the focus of the 
SC'arch thc•r<' involVC'cl was "l<>ss prrcise than that dirf'cted 
'
1 DPpt·nding upon Ilw l'in·ttm~tatH'I'~, tht•rt• ma~· ll<' probnbll' c·:llt~t· 
for tIll' ~t·n n·h to ht• a 11 t ltori;wd on!~ · for a dc·~igna t t•d portion of a 
pnrtil'ular road or :'llth t·au~t· m;t~ · t•xi~t for n dl'~ignntPd nn•a \\'hic·h 
mn~· rontain otll' or mon• rond~ or trnc·k~. l'arti('ularl~· along ntttl'h 
of tht• \fl'xit·nn hordl'r, tht•rt' nl'l' Yn~t an·n~ of uninhnbitt•d dl'~t·rt 
nnd nrid lnnd \\'hic·h art' tr:t\'Pr~t·d b~· fl'\\', if nn~·. mnin rond~ or 
higll\nt~ · ~. but \\'hi<"h lll'\Trtlll'lt·~" mn~ · :dford opportunit'iC'::;-b~· 
\'il't\tC of t hl'ir i~ol:tl C'd rita 1':1<"1 ('!'- for 1111• ~mug;gling of aliC'n~. 
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against mon' conventional types of crime." and that 
"I d_liffrrent standards may be compatible with the 
Fourth "\nwndmcnt if they arc reasonable both i11 rela-
tion to thr legitimate ll('C' rl of Government ... and the 
protectC'd rights of our citiz<'ns." 407 C S .. at 322-323. 
Yet\\'(' rf'fUS<'d to ahalHion the Fourth Amendnwnt com-
mitmPilt to tlw use of search warrants \\'he11ew'r this .is 
feasible " ·ith duP rrgard to thC' interests affected. 
For tlw reasons stated above. 1 think a rational search 
\\·arrant procedun' 1~ feasible .in case8 of this kind. As 
no warrant was obtain<'d lwrc . 1 agree that the judgment 
must be reV<'rsed. 1 ('Xpress 110 opinion as to whether 
then' was probable cause to issue a warrant on the facts 
of this particular case. 
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